What happened
On May 20, 2022, at Hyakuri Airfield, an Embraer ERJ170-200STD, registration JA10FJ, operated by Fuji Dream Airlines Co., Ltd., attempted to land on Runway 21R while a Japan Air Self-Defense Force inspection vehicle was still occupying the runway. The aircraft was operating as a charter flight with 43 passengers and four crew members on board.
Earlier that day, a vehicle belonging to the Civil Engineering Squadron of the Japan Air Self-HD Force had entered Runway 21R to inspect aircraft arresting barriers. While the vehicle had been granted runway entry at 13:50, it had been performing inspections of various barrier locations for several decades of minutes. At approximately 14:47, the controller in charge of the tower issued a landing clearance to the approaching Embraer ERJ170-200STD.
As the aircraft approached, the crew of the inspection vehicle noticed the descending plane and contacted the ground control position to inquire about arriving traffic. Upon realizing the vehicle was still on the runway, the controllers instructed the aircraft to perform a go-around. The aircraft commenced its climb at 14:50, avoiding a collision with the vehicle, which was positioned approximately 1,000 meters from the aircraft's path.
The investigation
The Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB) examined the actions of several air traffic controllers, including those performing on-the-job training. The investigation reviewed radar tracks, radio communications, and flight data recorder records. Investigators looked into the coordination between the tower control, ground control, and coordinator positions, as well as the effectiveness of the reminders set on the control consoles regarding runway availability.
Findings
- The primary cause was that the controller issued a landing clearance to JA10FJ while the inspection vehicle was still on the runway.
- The controller had forgotten the existence of the vehicle due to a lack of recent communication between the vehicle and the tower, as no updates had been provided for approximately 40 minutes.
- The ground control supervisor failed to provide the necessary oversight to complement the tower controller's actions.
- The work environment at the tower reduced situational awareness, as multiple controllers were simultaneously engaged in on-the-job training, including verbal knowledge checks and error-checking of radio logs.
- The controllers failed to notice the digital reminders on their consoles that indicated the runway was not available for landing.