What happened
On August 8, 2024, at approximately 13:45 JST, a Eurocopter EC135P2+, registration JA824H, landed on the runway at Kobe Airport rather than the assigned landing site. The aircraft, operated by a flight school, was conducting a radio equipment test flight following a period of limited flight activity.
During the approach, the air traffic controller (ATC) cleared the helicopter to land at the C helipad, a location situated on a taxiway. While the pilot correctly read back the instruction, the pilot subsequently decided to deviate from the assigned path to follow the school's specific course implementation guidelines. The pilot intended to use the approach as an opportunity to practice precise flight maneuvers, similar to touch-and-go training. Consequently, the aircraft turned toward Runway 27 instead of aligning with the parallel taxiway for the C helipad. The mechanic on board noticed the deviation but did not intervene, assuming they had misheard the ATC. The helicopter touched down on the runway short of the centerline marking.
The investigation
The JTSB investigation examined the flight history, the pilot's recent flight experience, and the communication between the crew and ATC. The investigation found that the pilot had not performed a controlled landing on a runway in over two months. Furthermore, the investigation noted that the pilot did not perform a verbal callout to reconfirm the landing point during the final approach, a practice the pilot typically used in fixed-wing aircraft but omitted here because the helicopter's landing gear configuration did not require such a check.
Findings
- The pilot's focus shifted from the ATC-assigned landing point to following the school's training guidelines, which led to an unintentional deviation from the landing clearance.
- The pilot's desire to practice specific flight headings and patterns caused the aircraft to target the runway instead of the designated helipad.
- The mechanic observed the heading change but failed to alert the pilot due to a lack of confidence in their understanding of the ATC communications.
- The ATC was unable to provide corrective instructions in time, as the deviation only became apparent during the final stages of the landing sequence.
Safety action
Following the incident, the flight school implemented several safety measures, including revised procedures requiring pilots to verify landing points against ATC instructions before final descent. The school also introduced mandatory Threat and Error Management (TEM) and Crew Resource Management (CRM) training for both pilots and mechanics. Additionally, new protocols were established for mutual confirmation of landing clearances between the pilot and the onboard crew.