What happened
On 29 June 2014, a Badr Airlines cargo flight, operating an Ilyushin IL-76TD with registration ST-BDN, was arriving at Sharjah International Airport from Khartoum, Sudan. The flight, consisting of four crew members, a loadmaster, and a ground engineer, requested a visual approach from Dubai Arrival Air Traffic Control.
Upon entering Sharjah Tower's airspace, the crew was cleared to land on runway 30. However, as the aircraft descended, the flight crew inadvertently aligned the aircraft with a new runway that was currently undergoing construction rather than the active runway. The error was only discovered at a very low altitude, approximately 50 feet above the ground and 0.3 miles from the threshold, when the captain noticed the runway markings were incorrect.
The crew immediately executed a go-around. During the low-level maneuver, the jet blast from the aircraft's engines displaced a piece of construction equipment weighing approximately one ton. There were no injuries to the six persons on board or the ground workers, who had quickly cleared the area upon seeing the aircraft.
The investigation
An investigation by the GCAA AAIS focused on the approach and landing preparation phases. Investigators examined the flight crew's navigation materials, the dispatch briefing process, and the communication between air traffic control units. The inquiry also reviewed the accuracy of aeronautical charts and the effectiveness of the airport's safety management systems during the runway construction period.
Findings
- The flight crew was unable to identify the correct landing surface during the final stages of the approach.
- The crew relied on an incorrect airport chart within the Jeppesen Airway Manual that had not yet become effective.
- The dispatch briefing was inadequate, failing to highlight critical updates regarding the temporary runway configuration.
- There was a lack of effective Crew Resource Management (CRM) among the flight crew.
- Conflicting information between the Aeronautical Information Circular (AIC) and the Jeppesen manual contributed to the confusion.
- The Tower Controller's visual monitoring of the approach was insufficient, and the Approach Controller did not explicitly notify the Tower that the aircraft was on a visual approach.