Summary
On 29 June 2014, a Badr Airlines Ilyushin IL-76TD, registration ST-BDN, operating cargo flight BDR7625 from Khartoum, Sudan, to Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, experienced a runway confusion incident during a visual approach at Sharjah International Airport. The aircraft was cleared to land on runway 30 but instead aligned with a new runway under construction. The crew initiated a go-around when the captain observed cross markings indicating the runway was not operational. There were no injuries to the six persons on board, and no damage to the aircraft.
Flight History
The flight crew consisted of four flight crewmembers, one ground engineer, and one loadmaster. During the approach, the crew requested a visual approach from Dubai Arrival Air Traffic Control (ATC) Approach, which was approved. The crew was instructed to descend to 2,000 ft and report ready for visual approach. When abeam Sharjah Airport, the Approach Controller instructed them to report the field in sight. At approximately 8 nautical miles, the flight was transferred to Sharjah Tower. At around 0319 UTC, the crew contacted the tower, stating they were about six miles from the runway. The tower provided the QNH and surface wind (calm), cleared them to land on runway 30, and instructed them to vacate via taxiway Bravo. The crew read back the instructions correctly.
As the aircraft continued the final approach, it was aligned with a new runway that was still under construction. At a late stage in the approach, the captain noticed cross marks on the runway and realized it was not in operation. Construction workers assigned to the new runway rapidly vacated the area when they observed the aircraft at about 50 ft altitude and 0.3 miles from the threshold. The aircraft passed over construction equipment, and a piece of equipment weighing about one ton was moved by the jet blast. The crew executed a go-around and landed on the correct runway without further incident.
Investigation Findings
The investigation, conducted by the Air Accident Investigation Sector of the UAE General Civil Aviation Authority, identified several causes and contributing factors. The causes included the flight crew's inability to identify the correct landing surface; the use of an incorrect airport chart from the Jeppesen Airway Manual that was not yet effective on the date of the incident; an inadequate dispatch briefing that did not provide sufficient information or draw attention to a temporary revised page in the Jeppesen manual; insufficient crew resource management (CRM) among the flight crew; and confusing wording in an Aeronautical Information Circular (AIC) and Jeppesen runway information, which improperly depicted a chart reflecting a future runway configuration.
Contributing factors included insufficient visual observation of the approach by the Sharjah Tower Controller; a lack of information provided by the Approach Controller to the Tower Controller that the flight was on a visual approach; and insufficient testing and training for the Tower Controller to differentiate which runway an aircraft was aligned with.
Probable Cause
The investigation concluded that the causes of the runway confusion incident were the inability of the flight crew to identify the correct landing surface; the crew's use of an incorrect airport chart from the Jeppesen Airway Manual that was not yet effective on the date of the incident; the inadequate dispatch briefing; insufficient CRM among the flight crew; and confusing AIC and Jeppesen runway information that improperly depicted a future runway configuration.
Safety Recommendations
The final report included five safety recommendations addressed to the operator (Badr Airlines), four to the Sharjah International Airport Authority, one to Dubai Air Navigation Services, and one to Jeppesen Company.