What happened
On 14 February 2012, an Airbus A319-111, registration G-EZFV, was performing a scheduled passenger flight from Faro, Portugal, to London Luton Airport. The flight crew, consisting of a training captain and a captain-under-training, was conducting a manual ILS approach to Runway 26. During the approach, the pilot flying (PF) inadvertently selected the expedite climb mode instead of the approach mode, which required the crew to revert to manual flight to intercept the localiser.
As the aircraft descended below 30 ft, both pilots perceived that the aircraft was sinking rapidly. In response, both crew members initiated a TOGA 10 go-around procedure. During this transition, the pilot flying momentarily retarded the thrust levers to idle before advancing them to the takeoff position. Simultaneously, the pilots provided conflicting control inputs. The pilot flying made a forward sidestick input, while the commander provided an aft sidestick input. Because the sidesticks on this aircraft type move independently, the commander was unaware of the PF's input.
The resulting net effect of these simultaneous inputs was a pitch-down command. The aircraft made firm contact with the runway with a normal acceleration of 2.99g, which is classified as a Severe Hard Landing. Following the impact, the aircraft lifted off and completed the go-around, eventually returning for an uneventful landing.
The investigation
An AAIB field investigation examined the flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data. The investigation focused on the sequence of control inputs and the mechanical impact on the aircraft. Analysis of the FDR revealed that the aircraft's pitch attitude decreased due to the opposing inputs. The investigation also looked into the aircraft's landing gear components to assess the extent of the structural impact.
Findings
- The aircraft's landing gear sustained significant damage, with the nose landing gear shock absorber, the left main gear sliding tube assembly, and the right main gear fitting and sliding tube assembly all exceeding their maximum certified loads.
- The pilot flying made a sidestick input that, when combined with the commander's input, resulted in a net pitch-down control input.
- The commander did not use the sidestick takeover pushbutton to establish sole control, which would have prevented the opposing inputs from counteracting his nose-up command.
- The crew's perception of a rapid sink rate triggered the simultaneous, uncoordinated go-around inputs.