What happened
On 26 June 1998, an Airbus A3pend A320-231, registration G-OOAB, was performing a scheduled public transport flight from Bristol Airport to Heraklion. The aircraft was heavily loaded at 73.1 tonnes for a takeoff from Runway 27. During the takeoff roll, the commander rotated the aircraft at the calculated speed, but shortly after liftoff, a physical impact was felt.
While the flight crew initially suspected turbulence, cabin crew reported that passengers at the rear of the aircraft had felt and heard the tail striking the runway. The crew decided to return to Bristol for an inspection. The aircraft landed safely on the wet runway, but a subsequent inspection revealed scrape damage to the underside of the aft fuselage and several drain masts. There were no fatalities and no injuries to the 179 passengers or 7 crew members on board.
The investigation
Investigators examined the aircraft's structure and found evidence of contact between the drain masts and the runway surface. A scrape mark was also identified on the runway itself, near a centerline light. Analysis of the flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) provided critical insights into the pilot's inputs during the rotation phase.
The FDR revealed that the commander applied a significantly higher rearward sidestick input than observed in other similar flights. Furthermore, a large lateral sidestick deflection was applied during the rotation. This lateral movement was sufficient to trigger the deployment of the roll spoilers on the left wing, which simultaneously reduced wing lift and increased the nose-up pitch rate. The investigation found that the resulting pitch rotation rate was more than double the recommended 3° per second.
Findings
- The primary cause of the tailscrape was excessive rearward and lateral sidestick inputs during the rotation phase.
- The lateral input caused spoiler deployment, which increased the pitch rate and decreased lift, leading to the tail striking the ground.
- The commander had not been trained in the specific technique of centralizing the sidestick laterally during rotation, a practice recommended in the Airbus Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM).
- A discrepancy existed between the operator's Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), which focused on rotation rate, and the manufacturer's FCOM, which emphasized lateral sidestick centralization.
Safety action
Upon identifying the discrepancy between their company SOPs and the manufacturer's instructions, the operator issued a notice to all pilots regarding the revised Airbus advice. The AAIB noted that no further safety recommendations were required due to the operator's prompt corrective action.