What happened
On 21 June 2000, an Airbus A3/21-211, registration EI-CPE, was performing a scheduled passenger flight from Dublin to London Heathrow. During the approach to Runway 27R, the first officer was acting as the pilot flying. While the approach was initially established on the ILS, the aircraft became destabilised below 300 feet due to local turbulence and gusty wind conditions.
As the aircraft descended, the rate of descent increased significantly. At approximately 200 feet, the aircraft began to deviate above the glideslope. In an attempt to correct the flight path, the first officer applied forward sidestick input, which caused the aircraft to pitch down and the rate of descent to accelerate to between 800 and 900 feet per minute. At 60 feet, the first officer began applying significant aft sidestick input to flare. This late and heavy input, combined with the aircraft's pitch inertia, resulted in a firm touchdown at 130 knots.
The impact caused the aircraft to bounce. Upon the initial touchdown, the ground spoilers deployed, which contributed to a further increase in pitch attitude. During the second touchdown, the aft fuselage made contact with the runway, causing damage to the lower skin between frames 63 and 67 and bending the aft galley drain mast. The crew only became aware of the incident after being notified by air traffic control and cabin crew.
The investigation
The AAIB examined the flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder, alongside manufacturer simulations. The investigation established that the aircraft's pitch attitude was abnormally low (0.5° nose-up) at the start of the flare due to the previous nose-down correction.
Testing in a simulator revealed that a sustained loss of headwind below 100 feet had further destabilised the approach. The investigation also noted that the commander's ability to intervene was limited because he did not use the sidestick takeover pushbutton, meaning his inputs were algebraically added to the first officer's existing aft-stick demand rather than overriding it.
Findings
- The approach became destabilised by local turbulence and gusty crosswinds.
- A loss of headwind below 100 feet contributed to the flight path deviation.
- The first officer applied a large and late aft sidestick input, which, combined with pitch inertia and the deployment of ground spoilers, caused the aircraft to pitch up excessively during the bounce.
- The aircraft's pitch attitude at the second touchdown reached 9.8°, exceeding the 9.7° threshold for a tailstrike on this model.
- The commander's corrective inputs were less effective because the takeover pushbutton was not utilised.
Safety action
- Recommendation 2001-46: It is recommended that Airbus Industrie reissue the Operator's Manual Bulletin regarding tailstrikes to include guidance on detecting flight path destabilisation and the necessity of using the takeover pushbutton for effective intervention.