History of the Flight
On 18 July 2008, an Airbus A321-211, registration G-DHJH, operated a commercial passenger flight from Manchester to Ibiza and return. The flight crew consisted of three pilots: a training captain as commander, a co-pilot undertaking line training, and a first officer as jump seat occupant. The commander reviewed the co-pilot's training file before departure, interpreting that the co-pilot "had had difficulty landing the aeroplane and had had to have extra landings."
The commander decided the co-pilot would be the pilot flying on the outbound sector. During the flight, the commander covered training items and briefed the co-pilot on landing techniques, highlighting differences between the A320 and A321. He instructed the co-pilot to "check" the rate of descent at 20 ft with a nose-up sidestick input while retarding the thrust levers.
On the approach to Ibiza, the co-pilot flew a visual circuit in good weather with light wind. The landing was "firm," and the co-pilot identified that he flared too late. For the return flight to Manchester, the commander again briefed the co-pilot on the landing procedure, similar to the outbound sector.
The Accident Landing
The weather at Manchester at 1950 hrs was wind 180°/5 kt. At about 8 nm from touchdown, the commander handed control to the co-pilot. The co-pilot disconnected the autopilot at 1,200 ft, leaving the autothrust engaged. The commander observed the co-pilot's sidestick inputs as "over-active." At 1,000 ft, stable approach parameters were satisfied, and the commander called "stable A321."
During the final moments, the commander gave coaching narrative but realized the landing would be problematic as the co-pilot closed the thrust levers. The aircraft touched down firmly and bounced. The commander considered taking control but noted the co-pilot appeared to hold the aircraft's attitude, and he believed he made no sidestick input. However, FDR data showed a slight movement of his sidestick. After the second touchdown, the landing progressed normally. The co-pilot taxied to the stand.
Post-Landing Actions
The commander and co-pilot discussed the landing and considered it not heavy. The commander asked company line engineers who were passengers for their opinion. They stated that if no "load 15 report" had been printed and the commander did not consider the landing heavy, no action was needed. No report had been printed. The commander later wrote in the co-pilot's training file that the co-pilot "forgot to flare giving hard landing." He assessed the co-pilot's progress as 'below target' and briefed the next training captain.
Aircraft Damage
After two further sectors, an unrelated inspection of the landing gear found a crack in a wing gear rib support lug. Four Safety Recommendations were made.
Crew Background
The commander was 51 years old, held an ATPL with type rating, and had 12,200 total hours. The co-pilot began flying in 2000, worked as an instructor, then flew Boeing 757 for the operator. He converted to Airbus in May-June 2008 and completed base training on A320 in early July. His base training report noted a tendency to be late on the flare on two occasions.
The co-pilot described being "confused" by the commander's coaching during the landing. The next day, he operated another line training flight with a different training captain, making good landings with minimal coaching. His training continued, and he successfully completed line release.
Manufacturer's Instructions
The Airbus Flight Crew Operating Manual (FCOM) and Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM) provide landing procedures. At 50 ft, auto-trim ceases and pitch law modifies to flare law. At 30 ft, the system begins reducing pitch attitude at 2° down in 8 seconds, requiring aft sidestick to maintain path. The flare height is about 30 ft. The FCTM advises to avoid under flaring and to start the flare with positive backpressure, avoiding forward stick movement once initiated. At 20 ft, the "RETARD" call-out reminds the pilot to retard thrust levers.