What happened
On 18 July 2008, an Airbus A321-211, registration G-DHJH, experienced a severe hard landing while arriving at Manchester Airport. The flight crew, which included a commander and a co-pilot undergoing line training, were operating a commercial passenger flight. During the approach, the commander provided coaching to the co-pilot, intending to guide the landing technique. However, the aircraft touched down with a high rate of descent and significant vertical acceleration.
Following the landing, the crew did not formally report a landing parameter exceedance. While the crew discussed the firmness of the landing with ground engineers, no technical log entry was made. The aircraft continued to operate for two additional sectors before a subsequent, unrelated inspection of the landing gear revealed a crack in a wing gear rib support lug.
The investigation
The AAIB investigation examined flight data and the physical condition of the landing gear. Analysis of the Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) programme revealed that the landing was actually a severe hard landing, with a vertical acceleration of 2.66g and a descent rate of 14 ft/s, exceeding the limits defined in the aircraft's LOAD <15> report.
The investigation also looked into the reporting process. It was found that the aircraft's Data Management Unit was not configured to automatically print the LOAD <15> report, meaning the crew would have had to manually interrogate the system to identify the exceedance. Furthermore, the commander'1s interpretation of the co-pilot's training file, which noted a tendency for late flares, influenced the coaching provided during the approach.
Engineers examined the cracked lug using scanning electron microscopy. The analysis determined that the failure was caused by fatigue growth originating from surface corrosion pitting. While the investigation could not confirm if the specific hard landing at Manchester accelerated the final fracture, the crack had likely been developing over a significant period.
Findings
- The landing of G-DHJH was a severe hard landing, characterized by a vertical acceleration of 2.66g.
- The co-pilot's flare was initiated at an appropriate height but at an insufficient rate of pitch change to sufficiently reduce the descent rate.
- The lack of an automated printout for the LOAD <15> report contributed to the failure to identify the landing exceedance immediately.
- The crack in the wing gear rib lug was caused by fatigue growth initiated by corrosion pitting.
Safety action
- It is recommended that Airbus ensures the generation of a LOAD <15> report following a landing parameter exceedance is clearly indicated to the flight crew.
- It is recommended that the CAA requires operators to provide training on the procedures and interpretation of Airbus LOAD <15> reports.
- It is recommended that EASA ensures adequate training is provided to ground engineers regarding the troubleshooting of suspected hard landings.