What happened
On 28 July 2008, an Airbus A321-231, registration G-MARA, was operating a night passenger charter flight from Malaga to Manchester International Airport. During the final stages of the landing flare, the co-pilot, who was acting as the pilot flying, made a rapid movement of the sidestick from a fully forward to a fully aft position. This input caused the aircraft to pitch down abruptly, resulting in a touchdown at a nose-down attitude.
The impact caused the nose landing gear to compress heavily, leading to a bounce and a second touchdown. While no injuries were reported among the 159 passengers or 8 crew members, three passenger service unit oxygen masks were displaced from their stowages. Following the landing, the aircraft was taxied to its stand normally.
The investigation
During a subsequent flight from Manchester, the crew found they were unable to retract the landing gear and received a fault message regarding the shock absorber. An investigation revealed that the nose landing gear's internal shock absorber assembly had been severely distorted. Additionally, a link rod connecting the proximity sensor target mounting was found to be bent.
The investigation examined flight data from the FDR and QAR. The data showed that while the landing was firm, the recorded parameters did not exceed the specific thresholds required to trigger an automatic LOAD <15> report. The investigation also looked into the co-pilot's sidestick technique, noting that a non-standard grip might have contributed to the unintended forward input. Furthermore, the investigation reviewed the maintenance engineer's decision-making process, which relied on the absence of an automatic report to conclude that no further inspections were necessary.
Findings
- The co-pilot's sudden sidestick movement caused the aircraft to land in a nose-down attitude, leading to the internal distortion of the nose landing gear shock absorber.
- The lack of an automatic LOAD <15> report led the maintenance engineer to believe no structural inspection was required, as the recorded descent rate and acceleration were within limits.
- The maintenance engineer's interpretation of the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) flow chart differed from the manufacturer's intent, as the engineer did not perform a data download to verify the landing conditions.
- The bent proximity switch link rod served as a physical indicator of the nose gear's full compression, but this specific component was not explicitly flagged for inspection in the AMM.