What happened
On the night of 4 February 2002, an Airbus Industrie A320-211, registration EI-CVD, was taxiing into Stand N84 at London Heathrow Airport. The aircraft, operating a passenger flight, was entering the stand from the west. As part of standard procedure to prevent blinding ground personnel, the commander had deactivated the aircraft taxi lights before turning into the stand. The pilot utilized the AGNIS centreline guidance system and stopped the aircraft at the designated PAPA stop point.
Following the stop, ground technicians alerted the crew that the outer side of the No 1 engine nacelle had made contact with a parked vehicle. The vehicle involved was one of two baggage belt loaders, belonging to a different airline, which had been left on the stand by a crew servicing a previous departure. The impact caused a one-metre long gash in the outboard cowling of the engine.
The investigation
Investigators from the Airport Police, the airline, and the Airport Authority examined the stand and the aircraft. The inspection confirmed that the Airbus A320-211 had been positioned correctly on the stand centreline and at the appropriate distance from the terminal. The investigation established that the belt loader had been left unattended and was positioned approximately four metres beyond the marked safe parking zone.
Environmental conditions on the night were dark, wet, and windy, with significant flight delays affecting operations. The investigation found that the flight dispatcher, while preoccupied with cargo documentation, had requested a ramp agent to activate the stand guidance systems. The ramp agent activated the systems believing the stand was clear. The dispatcher arrived at the airbridge control position as the aircraft was turning into the stand but failed to notice the obstructing equipment. By the time the dispatcher observed ground staff signaling a problem, the collision had already occurred.
Findings
- The primary cause of the incident was the improper parking of ground vehicles outside of designated safety zones.
- The belt loaders were positioned in an area partially obscured by the shadow of the airbridge jetty.
- The commander's visibility of the equipment was reduced because the aircraft taxi lights were switched off and rain on the windshields hindered the view.
- The co-pilot's view of the obstruction was blocked by the aircraft's own fuselage once the plane reached the centreline.
- The flight dispatcher's field of view from the control position did not include the area where the belt loaders were parked.
- The ramp agent activated the guidance systems without performing a physical check of the stand for obstructions.