Antonov 12 LZ-SFK Accident at Exeter Airport

Incident Overview and Aircraft Details On 10 July 2001 at 1226 UTC, an Antonov 12 with registration LZ-SFK, manufactured in 1964 and powered by four A1-20M turboprop engines, was involved in an accident at Exeter Airport, Devon. The aircraft was operating a public transport cargo flight from Casablanca, carrying 7.7 tonnes of freight. The landing weight was 51 tonnes, below the maximum permitted 58 tonnes. The crew consisted of eight members, with one passenger on board. No injuries were reported to either the crew or the passenger. ## Approach and Landing Sequence The aircraft was on an ILS approach to Runway 26, with the First Officer flying manually under the supervision of the commander, who was following through on the controls. The approach was flown in heavy rain and turbulence, with poor forward visibility despite the use of windscreen wipers. The crew continued on instruments to the decision height of 200 feet, then transitioned to a visual approach. The aircraft was configured with 35 degrees of landing flap and the landing gear was confirmed locked down. The approach speed was 270 kph. ## Accident Sequence At approximately 50 feet, the commander took control of the aircraft and observed a marked nose-up trim, which required significant force on the control column to correct. The commander closed the throttles, and the aircraft landed on the main landing gear, bounced, and touched down a second time. During the landing roll, the right main landing gear collapsed, causing the right wingtip to contact the ground. The No. 4 engine propeller also contacted the runway surface. The aircraft left the runway in a gentle arc to the right, approximately 500 metres from the threshold, and came to a stop on a grass area north of Runway 26, about 800 metres from the touchdown point. ## Post-Accident Actions and Assessment The crew performed emergency shutdown procedures and evacuated the aircraft through a side door in the cargo hold. The airfield Rescue and Fire Fighting Service responded immediately. The commander assessed the probable causes as an abrupt change in wind direction and speed after crossing the threshold, a breakdown in coordination between the commander and First Officer regarding the nose-up trim, and the combination of a 3.5-degree glide path with aiming for a point before the ILS touchdown zone, which may have contributed to a high rate of descent.