What happened
During a landing, a Boeing 737 experienced an initial bounce followed by a significant hard landing, recording a load of 2.96 G. The sequence began when the pilot performed a late flare while maintaining thrust above idle power. This combination caused the aircraft to bounce. During the subsequent bounce, the ground spoilers and speedbrakes deployed while the aircraft was still airborne, which drastically reduced lift and contributed to the heavy impact upon the second touchdown.
The investigation
The investigation focused on the pilot's training background and the procedures used during the approach. It was discovered that the third-party training provider used a different flare height than specified in the Boeing 737 NG/MAX flight crew training manual (FCTM). While the FCTM recommends a flare at approximately 20 ft, the training provider instructed pilots to prepare for the flare at 30 ft and execute it at 25 ft.
This discrepancy meant that when the pilot transitioned to the operator's requirements, the change in the visual approach profile likely caused confusion and reduced reaction time. Although the operator's conversion course was designed to align with the FCTM's 20 ft requirement, the training records did not indicate that the pilot struggled with this height difference. The investigation noted that the increased cognitive load of adjusting an established habit during a time-critical phase of flight likely contributed to the error.
Findings
- The pilot performed a late flare and failed to reduce engine thrust to idle prior to the first touchdown.
- The deployment of speedbrakes and spoilers during the bounce reduced lift, leading to the hard landing.
- A training provider taught flare altitudes that deviated from the manufacturer's FCTM specifications, creating a risk of unstable approaches.
- The operator's conversion training failed to identify or rectify the discrepancy in flare height training.