No fatalities

2017-02-12: The Boeing Company 747-47UF (N416MC) — 15 km north-north-west of Sydney Airport, New South Wales

15 km north-north-west of Sydney Airport, New South Wales

On February 12, 2017, a The Boeing Company 747-47UF (registration N416MC) was involved in an aviation accident near 15 km north-north-west of Sydney Airport, New South Wales. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: These findings should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual. The descent below the nominal 3° approach glideslope was probably the result of the aircraft auto-pilot capturing a distorted glideslope beam. This summary draws on records from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB).

Sourcesthe Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB)Primary reportUpdated 1779789463Data APIEditorial standards
Aircraft registered N416MC
Aircraft registered N416MC. Photo: Kentaro Iemoto from Tokyo, Japan / CC BY-SA 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

An aircraft (N416MC) experienced a glideslope failure indication after a Boeing 787 on taxiway A1 likely distorted the ILS signal during approach to runway 16R.

Incident Description

During a final approach, the aircraft with registration N416MC intercepted the approach path, and its autopilot captured the instrument landing system (ILS) localiser and glideslope simultaneously. At that time, a Boeing 787 was holding on taxiway A1. Taxiway A1 lies within the critical area for the glideslope of runway 16R. The presence of the Boeing 787 in that critical area likely caused N416MC to receive either a distorted glideslope beam or a beam with varying signal strength. This condition led to a glideslope failure indication, which prompted intervention by the flight crew. The captain detected the failure by crosschecking the two primary flight displays.

ATC Procedures

At the time of the incident, the glideslope critical area was not required to be protected, in accordance with the manual of air traffic services.

ATSB Commentary

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) noted that regulators and manufacturers have previously observed that it is common practice for operators to conduct coupled approaches and autoland to satisfy maintenance, training, or reliability program requirements. These approaches may be performed in weather conditions that do not necessitate protection of the ILS signal. There have been prior incidents in which the autopilot responded to disturbances in the ILS signal when the aircraft was close to landing. Airservices Australia advises that ILS signals can be disturbed, with consequential effects on autoland performance, even when weather conditions do not require protection of the ILS critical area. For additional information on ILS signal distortion and the determination of protected areas following the introduction of the Airbus A380, the ATSB referenced an assessment titled 'Assessment of ILS protection areas impact on large aircraft operations.'