No fatalities

2017-09-04: ATR-GIE Avions de Transport Régional ATR 72-212A (P2-ATR) — PNG Air — Cairns Airport, Queensland

Cairns Airport, Queensland

On September 4, 2017, an ATR-GIE Avions de Transport Régional ATR 72-212A (registration P2-ATR) operated by PNG Air was involved in an aviation accident near Cairns Airport, Queensland. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: These findings should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual. The selected FMS mode was inappropriate for the assigned departure and provided flight path guidance not aligned with the SID. This summary draws on records from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB).

Sourcesthe Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB)Primary reportUpdated 1779789180Data APIEditorial standards
Aircraft registered P2-ATR
Aircraft registered P2-ATR. Photo: Kok Chwee SIM / CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

During departure, flight crew used lateral navigation instead of heading mode, causing an unintended turn past the assigned heading. ATC intervention corrected the deviation, and the flight continued without further incident.

Incident Overview

During the departure preparation, the flight crew opted to use the lateral navigation mode of the Flight Management System (FMS) to provide flight path guidance, rather than the more appropriate heading mode. After takeoff, the FMS directed a turn that exceeded the assigned heading of 335°M, continuing to a heading of 025°M. The flight crew initially followed this guidance, incorrectly turning the aircraft to a heading of 013°M before selecting heading mode and detecting the error.

ATC Interaction

Around the same time, Air Traffic Control (ATC) observed the aircraft turning beyond the assigned heading and contacted the flight crew. The error was then managed by both ATC and the flight crew, and the flight proceeded without further incident.

System Use and Crew Actions

The choice to use lateral navigation mode, rather than heading mode, was made by the flight crew during pre-departure planning. This decision led to the FMS commanding a turn that was not aligned with the assigned heading. The crew's initial adherence to the FMS guidance resulted in a heading deviation that was later corrected after switching to heading mode and receiving ATC communication.

Conclusion

The event highlights a deviation from standard operating procedures regarding mode selection during departure. The flight crew's subsequent actions, along with ATC assistance, ensured the safe continuation of the flight. No further issues were reported.