Accident Overview
On the afternoon of 3 March 2022, a Cessna U206G, registered VH-JVR, was operating a low-level geophysical survey flight. While on the 25th survey line, the aircraft collided with terrain and was subsequently destroyed in a post-impact fire. The pilot sustained fatal injuries.
Aircraft and Flight Path
The last recorded position of the aircraft was on a survey line consistent with the planned survey parameters. Comparison of available flight data indicated that the aircraft's location was similar to that of previous procedure turns, suggesting it was being maneuvered onto the next survey line at the time of the accident.
Loss of Control
Wreckage examination determined that the aircraft impacted trees in a left angle of bank, with a steep angle of impact and a nose-down attitude—indicative of a loss of control. The ATSB considered several potential reasons but found no evidence of bird strike, adverse weather, structural failure, flight control malfunction, or engine failure. The powerplant was producing power at impact. Post-mortem and toxicology examinations revealed no natural disease or substances. While some causes of incapacitation may not be identified post-mortem, there was no evidence of pilot incapacitation.
The pilot had previously completed 24 survey lines without apparent issues. Recorded data indicated that airspeed remained above the aerodynamic stall speed during procedure turns, with no indication of stall on previous turns. However, the data showed that procedure turns were consistently conducted at heights below which recovery from a stall and loss of control may not be possible. A stall was considered plausible but remained only a possibility due to the lack of recorded data beyond the last known position and no witness observations.
Contributing Factor
The ATSB identified a contributing factor: it was likely that, during a maneuver to intercept the next survey line, for undetermined reasons, control of the aircraft was lost at a height from which recovery was not possible, resulting in a collision with terrain.
Delayed Emergency Response
The operator had a phased emergency response plan based on elapsed time since estimated time of arrival (ETA). Each phase escalated concern. The distress phase would commence 30 minutes past ETA, contacting the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC). Each phase required accessing the satellite tracking system. When satellite tracking data stopped at 1343, the automatic watch function did not send an alert because it had not been activated. This was not noticed until 1430 during a periodic check by the ground operator. Although the operator had previously experienced dropouts, Spidertracks confirmed the device functioned as expected with no system outages. The ground operator could not contact the pilot via mobile phone, and no emergency beacon activated. The aircraft was not fitted with an emergency locator transmitter, but a personal locator beacon was carried; however, it was not worn by the pilot and was not readily accessible after the accident. The operations manager instructed the ground operator to follow the emergency response plan and wait until the ETA. When the aircraft did not arrive at its 1630 ETA, about 3 hours after the accident, the operator contacted the JRCC at 1701, which promptly initiated search and rescue.