Event Description
During the approach to land, the aircraft was significantly above the intended flight path, with an aim point approximately one third down the runway. The pilot, who was familiar with the approach, had been distracted by radio communications with a trailing aircraft and felt implied pressure to minimize runway occupancy. Attempting to correct, the pilot lowered the nose but did not reduce power to idle, causing the airspeed to increase to approximately 95 knots. The operator required a final approach speed of 70–71 knots, as specified in the aircraft flight manual (AFM). The pilot believed the target speed was 80 knots, leading to a deviation of about 24 knots.
Approach and Landing
While the pilot recognized the aircraft was both high and fast, the approach continued. Operator procedures mandated a go-around when the aircraft deviated more than 20 knots from the landing approach speed below 100 feet or was not on the correct flight path. The airspeed deviation exceeded this threshold based on the correct speed, but the pilot's incorrect understanding kept it within his personal limit. The aircraft was not on the correct flight path, yet no go-around was initiated. The flare commenced well beyond the planned touchdown point at a high airspeed. Due to the high speed and a downsloping runway, the aircraft floated significantly before touching down with less than one-third of the runway remaining.
Landing Roll and Braking
Performance calculations indicated that sufficient runway remained for the aircraft to stop if maximum braking was applied. Although the pilot retracted the flaps and applied pressure to the rudder pedals, the aircraft did not decelerate as expected. The braking system was functional before takeoff and after the accident, and no skidding was indicated, suggesting that maximum braking was not effectively applied. Consequently, the aircraft departed the end of the runway.
Training and Assessment
Initial training provided by the operator was not fully completed. The operator proficiency check was not performed, so the pilot was not assessed on several abnormal and emergency procedures in the GA8. However, the pilot had been judged competent in go-arounds and short-field landings during initial handling training and had completed line training flights. The required in-water practical exercise for general emergency training was not conducted, and recognition of prior learning was inapplicable because training with another operator had occurred more than six months prior. Despite these gaps, the pilot had received similar training twice in the preceding 26 months and was likely competent in that area. The pilot's pattern of using an incorrect approach speed was not identified or corrected during training, supervision, or checking flights conducted by Wave Air.
Contributing Factors
The approach was above profile with a high airspeed, and the pilot had an incorrect understanding of the required approach speed. The pilot did not initiate a go-around, resulting in a landing beyond the planned touchdown point. Despite adequate landing distance remaining, the pilot did not apply sufficient braking to prevent the aircraft departing the runway. Additionally, the training, supervision, and checking flights did not identify that an excessive approach speed was routinely used during final approach.