Accident Sequence
On the morning of 29 May 2025, a Cessna 310R, registered VH-NXA, operated by Marthakal Yolngu Airline on a non-scheduled air transport flight from Darwin to Lake Evella, Northern Territory, was conducting a straight-in visual approach to runway 08. The pilot assessed the approach as stable and continued with the landing. After crossing the runway threshold, the aircraft floated for a prolonged period and touched down before reaching a taxiway located about halfway along the runway. When the pilot applied braking past the airport’s apron area, the aircraft did not decelerate as expected. It overran the runway and collided with a fence. The pilot and passengers were uninjured, but the aircraft sustained substantial damage.
Pre-flight Maintenance
Maintenance completed on the aircraft three days before the occurrence involved numerous concurrent tasks conducted by a licensed aircraft maintenance engineer (LAME) with an apprentice. The apprentice conducted maintenance on the braking system due to leaking brake callipers. The LAME expected the apprentice to have replaced the main wheel brake pads during this task, influencing their assessment that the aircraft rolled forward during post-maintenance engine run-ups due to new brakes requiring burn-in. Physical verification of the brake pads was not conducted. On the morning of the occurrence, the LAME carried out corrective maintenance in response to a report of ‘spongy brakes’ the day prior. The pilot was aware of that report but not of the LAME’s experience with the aircraft rolling forward. During the pre-flight engine run-up, the brakes failed to keep the aircraft stationary; the pilot increased brake pressure and kept the aircraft stationary but did not advise maintenance. The pilot’s limited experience on multi-engine aircraft led them to consider this normal, reinforced by a brief discussion with another Cessna 310 pilot. The certifying LAME did not verify that the brake pads had been replaced, resulting in the aircraft being returned to service with worn brake pads on the right brake system.
Approach and Landing
Lake Evella Aerodrome was not equipped with visual slope guidance. The pilot relied on visual cues of the runway, typically using the runway threshold as the aiming point. Recorded data from the pilot’s Android phone indicated the aircraft was higher than the usual 3-degree flight path. The rate of descent exceeded 800 fpm for eight consecutive seconds until descending below 140 ft relative to the runway. The pilot recalled the approach ‘seemed stable,’ while the operator’s stable approach criteria permitted rates of descent up to 1,000 fpm. The aircraft crossed the threshold at a height of 55 ft with a ground speed of 94 kt. ATSB analysis concluded the airspeed was likely 6–7 kt above the Vref for the recalculated landing weight of 91 kt. As the aircraft neared touchdown, ground effect resulted in a considerable float distance due to excess airspeed, reducing the remaining landing distance available. Landing distances in the aircraft flight manual are based on achieving Vref at 50 ft above the runway; any additional airspeed results in later touchdown.
Weight and Balance
The operator’s self-reported passenger weight procedures and electronic weight and balance system, in combination with incorrect pre-flight weight calculations, led to the aircraft being operated above the weight limits specified in the pilot’s operating handbook. This contributed to the increased approach speed and landing distance requirements.