No fatalities

2025-08-28: Piper Aircraft Corp PA-28-236 (VH-TKX) — RAAF Base Tindal, Northern Territory

RAAF Base Tindal, Northern Territory

On August 28, 2025, a Piper Aircraft Corp PA-28-236 (registration VH-TKX) was involved in an aviation accident near RAAF Base Tindal, Northern Territory. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: After identifying a fault with the alternator, the licensed aircraft maintenance engineer encouraged the pilot to conduct the flight without assessing the time the battery could supply the aircraft with electrical power. This summary draws on records from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB).

Sourcesthe Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB)Primary reportUpdated 1779781482Data APIEditorial standards

On 28 August 2025, a Piper PA-28 lost electrical power during Outback Air Race. Pilot continued to Tindal, came close to F-35 on approach. Maintenance and pilot actions examined.

Incident Overview

On 28 August 2025, a pilot and passenger in a Piper Aircraft PA-28 were participating in stage 4 of the Outback Air Race, flying from Daly Waters Airport to RAAF Base Tindal, Northern Territory. The aircraft lost electrical power during the flight, and the pilot elected to continue to Tindal. On final approach, the aircraft came in close proximity to a Lockheed Martin F-35 that was also approaching the same runway.

Maintenance Issues

Prior to departure, the pilot identified a fault with the alternator and requested assistance from the race-provided licensed aircraft maintenance engineer (LAME). After determining that the alternator was unserviceable, the LAME encouraged the pilot to conduct the flight, wanting to get the aircraft to Tindal for maintenance. The battery was charged before departure to maximize available power, but the LAME did not assess the expected electrical load of the aircraft or the battery capacity to determine if it could provide sufficient power for the planned flight. The LAME provided assurance to the pilot that battery power was sufficient. No detailed discussion of the fault or contingency planning for an in-flight failure occurred. Additionally, no entry was made in the maintenance release to record the alternator issue or the work conducted, a legislated requirement. Such documentation would have allowed pilots and maintenance personnel a complete understanding of the unserviceability.

Pilot Actions

The pilot was aware that maintenance had been conducted on the alternator and that only the battery was supplying electrical power, thus recognizing an increased risk of electrical failure. Given the impact of a total electrical failure when flying to a controlled airport, contingency planning should have been conducted before departure. On the ground, this would have identified Homebush Park ALA as a viable alternate Class G airspace destination and ensured actions aligned with published emergency procedures. The pilot reported resetting the alternator's circuit breaker before departure, and the aircraft operated normally until the failure. However, the installed ammeter would have shown the alternator was not operating correctly, indicating the pilot likely did not effectively monitor the electrical system during flight.

When the aircraft was about 15 km from Homebush Park ALA, the battery charge depleted sufficiently to cause a loss of electrical power, and the pilot could not communicate with air traffic control (ATC) via radio. A telephone was available, and the pilot received information on how to call ATC directly, but did not do so because cockpit noise made effective communication difficult. The passenger's headset had Bluetooth functionality but was not used due to past difficulties. The pilot was concerned about the loss of power and also considered the possibility of an engine failure due to detected fumes. The pilot operating handbook advised landing as soon as practicable in such situations. At the time of the failure, the aircraft was in visual meteorological conditions, in non-controlled airspace, and close to Homebush Park ALA. Emergency procedures in the ERSA advised that in an emergency in Class G airspace, the pilot should remain in non-controlled airspace and land at the nearest suitable airport. Instead, the pilot used a group chat, and fellow race participants relayed information to ATC. The pilot requested a PAN be declared and subsequently believed they had priority to approach and land at Tindal, though direct communication with ATC was not established, and they did not receive confirmation that the PAN was received. The pilot did not follow advice that ATC had instructed them to remain outside controlled airspace and land at Homebush Park, consistent with radio failure procedures. This may have been influenced by perceived operational pressure to complete the flight to Tindal.

Air Traffic Control Interaction

ATC at Tindal was involved in the incident, but the source does not provide explicit details of their actions beyond the instruction to remain outside controlled airspace and land at Homebush Park. The pilot's communication via group chat and relay by fellow participants was the primary method of conveying information during the emergency.