What happened
During firefighting operations, the pilot of Helitak 3/68 entered a fireground area via a northern route, deviating from the expected flight path. This movement brought the helicopter into close proximity with Bomber 359 while the latter was performing a retardant drop. The two aircraft passed within approximately 500 m horizontally and 400 ft vertically of one another. While the helicopter pilot eventually spotted the aeroplane and manoeuvred to increase separation, the incident occurred without the air attack supervisor's knowledge of the specific flight path being used.
The investigation
The investigation examined the coordination between the air attack supervisor (AAS) and the flight crews. It was found that the pilot of Helitak 3/68 was unfamiliar with the specific fireground tactics and was unaware that aircraft were expected to hold and enter from the north. Although the AAS expected the helicopter to track east of the fireground, no specific instructions were issued to the pilot to follow that path.
Furthermore, a misunderstanding regarding clearances contributed to the event; the helicopter pilot believed they had been cleared to enter the area and assumed the AAS had ensured no conflicts with other aircraft would occur. Although both pilots were monitoring the fire common traffic advisory frequency (Fire-CTAF) and the fixed-wing pilot had broadcast their drop, neither crew was aware of the other's presence. The investigation noted that heavy radio traffic and potential terrain shielding may have hindered effective communication.
Findings
- The air attack supervisor failed to provide specific tracking instructions to the Helitak 3/68 pilot.
- The pilot of Helitak 3/68 operated under the mistaken belief that they had separation assurance and clearance for rappelling tasks.
- Communication failures prevented both crews from identifying the conflicting tracks, likely due to high frequency congestion and terrain interference.
- The pilot of Helitak 3/68 did not report the separation incident to the AAS, which prevented the implementation of required post-incident safety protocols and left the supervisor unaware of the actual flight path being used.