The Incident
On 28 April 1999 at 1603 UTC, a BAe 146 (registration EI-CLI) and a Piper PA-38-112 (registration G-BOZM) were involved in a near ground collision on Runway 33 at Birmingham Airport. The BAe 146 was operating a scheduled passenger flight to Dublin with 99 passengers and 6 crew. The PA-38 was conducting circuit training with an instructor and student; no passengers were on board. No injuries or damage were reported.
Sequence of Events
The BAe 146 crew, comprising a line training captain (left seat), a new first officer (right seat), and a safety pilot on the jump seat, received clearance from the tower to line up on Runway 33. The controller then transmitted a frequency change instruction for the aircraft to contact Birmingham Radar after passing 2,000 feet. The commander acknowledged this instruction. Believing that the transmission included a take-off clearance, the commander commenced the take-off roll without an explicit clearance. The first officer was the pilot flying and took control at 80 knots.
Meanwhile, the PA-38 was on a touch-and-go on Runway 06 at the same airport. As the BAe 146 accelerated, the tower controller realized it was taking off without clearance and transmitted "HOLD POSITION!" The BAe 146 commander heard his callsign and rejected the take-off. The instructor in the PA-38, alerted by the controller's urgent tone, applied heavy braking and turned left onto a heading of 330°, stopping with the right wing overhanging Runway 33. The left wing of the BAe 146 passed over the right wing of the PA-38 as it stopped.
After the incident, the PA-38 continued its circuit training, and the BAe 146 returned to the stand for a brake check before departing to Dublin later that day.
ATC Instructions
In March 1999, Birmingham ATC had issued an instruction (ATCSI 12/99) that departing IFR aircraft should contact Birmingham Radar after passing 2,000 feet, with the frequency change to be given as part of the take-off clearance. The controller involved misinterpreted the instruction, believing the frequency change and take-off clearance could be separated. This was a contributing factor to the misunderstanding.
Conclusion
The incident occurred because the BAe 146 took off without a clearance. An accumulation of factors included the controller's misinterpretation of the ATCSI and the pilot's assumption that the frequency change instruction was always followed by a take-off clearance.