Accident Overview
On December 10, 2011, at approximately 0610 UTC (1410 local time), a Beechcraft 65-80 Queen Air (registration RP-C824) departed Runway 13 of Manila Domestic Airport on a southbound flight to San Jose, Mindoro. The aircraft carried three persons: the pilot-in-command, another individual in the right cockpit seat, and a passenger.
Flight Sequence and ATC Communication
After departure, air traffic control instructed the pilot to turn right and report five miles out. The pilot complied and then requested a re-land, which ATC acknowledged, instructing the pilot to cross behind traffic on short final to Runway 06 (a perpendicular international runway) and to confirm whether experiencing difficulty. No further response was received from the pilot.
Observed Maneuvers and Descent
Witnesses on the ground reported hearing three loud sputtering or burst sounds emanating from the aircraft while it was in level flight southward at about 200 feet above ground level. The aircraft then initiated a left turn that progressed into a steep bank and roll-over in a dive. After approximately one complete roll, the aircraft struck the ground at coordinates 14.48848°N, 121.025811°E.
Post-Impact Fire and Ground Casualties
Upon impact, the aircraft exploded and fire immediately spread to adjacent shanties and a nearby elementary school building. The aircraft was almost completely consumed by fire, and several shanties were severely burned. A total of 13 persons sustained fatality injuries: the three aircraft occupants died due to non-survivable impact and were charred by the post-crash fire, and ten other persons on the ground (all residents near the impact point) incurred non-fatal injuries and were rushed to a hospital. Approximately 20 houses near the impact point were completely burnt, and the adjacent elementary school building was severely affected by fire.
Investigation Findings
The Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board determined the probable cause. The immediate cause was pilot’s lack of event proficiency in emergency procedures for one engine inoperative condition after takeoff. While such an event is considered survivable in training, the pilot failed to maintain aircraft control due to inadequate proficiency. A contributing cause was left engine failure during takeoff after V1 due to oil starvation, as evidenced by a severely burnt crankshaft assembly and frozen connecting rods. Underlying causes included inadequate pilot training for emergency procedures (the one-engine-inoperative scenario was not actually performed in training or simulators), inadequate engine overhaul capability of the approved maintenance organization (including unauthorized welding on the left engine), inadequate regulatory oversight of the overhaul activity, and an unnecessary deviation by ATC from the published standard VFR departure for Runway 13, which would have provided a safer corridor and more time to handle an emergency.