What happened
During a two-day training session intended to satisfy insurance requirements, a flight instructor and a pilot were operating a multi-engine airplane. On the second day of this training, radar tracking indicated the aircraft was maneuvering at an altitude between 1,000 and 1,2-00 feet above ground level. During these maneuvers, the aircraft transitioned from slow flight into a stall, which subsequently developed into a spin. The crew was unable to recover the aircraft before it struck the terrain, resulting in fatalities.
Witness accounts and flight data suggest the training environment involved high-risk maneuvers. During the preceding day of instruction, the aircraft had already experienced a full stall and spin at a very low altitude. Despite the pilot's familiarity with this specific multi-engine airplane model, the training continued under the same instructor.
Findings
An investigation of the wreckage found no evidence of mechanical failure or pre-existing malfunctions that would have prevented the aircraft from operating normally. Instead, the accident was linked to improper instructional techniques. The instructor utilized methods that deviated from established flight training standards and FAA guidance. Specifically, the instructor employed two highly dangerous maneuvers: increasing engine power before reducing the angle of attack during stall recovery, and the introduction of asymmetric power during the recovery process.
These specific techniques are known to increase the risk of an aircraft entering a spin. Furthermore, the training was conducted at an altitude significantly below the recommended 3,000 feet agl safety margin required for stall practice, leaving the crew with insufficient altitude to recover from the resulting spin.