Event Description
On 12 January 2007, a Gulfstream G-IV SP operated by the Swedish Air Force, with four crew members and four passengers on board, was parked on the northern apron of Berlin Tegel Airport. The crew planned an IFR flight from Berlin to Bremen. After contacting Tegel Ground, they requested engine start clearance and initially asked for runway 26R for departure. The ground controller suggested using runway 26L for an earlier departure, which the crew accepted.
Sequence of Events
As the aircraft taxied via taxiway NE towards the runways, the ground controller instructed the crew to contact Tower just before reaching the CAT II/III holding point for runways 26R/L. No coordination conversation between the ground and tower controllers had taken place. The ground controller then focused on another aircraft taxiing from the southern apron.
At 18:43:22, while the Gulfstream was still on ground frequency, the tower controller cleared an arriving aircraft to land on runway 26R. At 18:44:20, the Gulfstream's co-pilot called Tower: "Tower Swedforce … approaching CAT three holding runway two six right." The tower controller responded: "Swedforce… hello, line up runway two six left." The co-pilot queried: "… line up äh, runway two six left … and tower … confirm cleared to cross." The controller replied: "… there is no need to cross two äh, just line up runway two six left." The co-pilot acknowledged: "line up äh two six left …"
Approximately three seconds later, the arriving aircraft requested a wind check, which the controller provided. At 18:44:50, another aircraft taxiing from the southern apron reported: "Tegel tower … guten Abend taxiing to the holding point runway two six left." The controller cleared it: "… hello, in sequence line up runway two six left."
At 18:45:29, the Gulfstream co-pilot again contacted Tower: "Tower … continue and crossing runway two six äh to two six left." The controller asked: "… please confirm do you request two six right for departure or do you want to depart on two six left?" The pilot-in-command, noticing the co-pilot's doubts about the clearance, stopped the aircraft. Looking towards the final approach of runway 26R, he saw several approaching aircraft, the first very close. He took over the radio: "We are coming from the military apron and to get to the two six left we need to cross two six right." The controller then instructed: "Ah Swedforce … I am sorry, so I want you to hold short of runway two six right please." The crew complied, stopping before the CAT I holding point of runway 26R.
Contributing Factors
According to the BFU, the tower controller had assumed the Gulfstream was taxiing from the southern apron via taxiway SE. The ground controller had not coordinated the aircraft's position with the tower controller. The visibility from the tower was partially obstructed by a corner strut. The airport's surface movement radar was operational but its recordings were deleted after 10 days due to storage capacity limits. The aircraft was equipped with FDR and CVR, but their data were not available to the investigation.
Conclusions
The BFU assessed that the aircraft stopped before the CAT I holding point of runway 26R, outside the runway safety area, so there was no immediate danger of an accident. The event highlighted communication and coordination deficiencies between ground and tower control.