Near Miss Between Airbus A321 and Sailplane Near Reinfeld

Incident Overview On 23 July 2019, a serious incident occurred in Class E airspace near Reinfeld when an Airbus A321-231 operating under instrument flight rules (IFR) approached a Rolladen-Schneider LS 4 sailplane flying under visual flight rules (VFR). Flight data indicated a lateral separation of approximately 56 m and a vertical separation of approximately 46 ft. No persons were injured, and no damage was reported to either aircraft or third parties. ## Flight Details The Airbus A321 was on an IFR flight from Frankfurt to Hamburg-Fuhlsbüttel, carrying a five-person crew and 170 passengers. The flight crew reported being vectored by Bremen Radar for the southern ILS approach to runway 23. The controller instructed the crew to turn left to 280° and descend to 3,000 ft AMSL to intercept the ILS localizer. The flight management system had 3,000 ft AMSL selected as the target altitude, and the autopilot was engaged with a heading of 260°. The LS 4 sailplane, piloted by a 17-year-old female pilot, was on a VFR cross-country flight with a second sailplane, an ASG 29e. Both aircraft had departed from the sailport at Lübeck-Blankensee. The pilot reported being at approximately 3,600 ft AMSL, flying northwest over the southern part of Reinfeld, when the Airbus suddenly appeared on nearly the same heading just below her aircraft and overtook it on the right. She stated she did not see the Airbus in advance and could not avoid it, estimating the separation at 60–80 m horizontally and 20–30 m vertically. ## Air Traffic Control Context The responsible radar controller stated that several aircraft, including the Airbus, were on his control frequency minutes before the incident. Among them was another Airbus on approach to the special landing site Hamburg-Finkenwerder. The standard approaches to Hamburg-Fuhlsbüttel and Hamburg-Finkenwerder run parallel at a separation of approximately 1 NM. The controller reported having sequenced the Finkenwerder approach between a leading Fuhlsbüttel approach and the affected Airbus, placing the affected Airbus in an extended approach and early descent to 3,000 ft AMSL to distribute frequency load. Shortly after, he issued the instruction to turn left onto the final approach for runway 23. After the crew reported the proximity, the controller observed a primary radar target near the Airbus position on his monitor and provided traffic information to another aircraft following the Airbus. That aircraft reported no visual contact. At 18:24:17 local time, the primary radar target was displayed approximately 2 NM northwest of the Airbus; this was very likely the second sailplane. The affected sailplane was not displayed, and it could not be determined whether it had been displayed earlier. ## Data and Separation At 18:24:24 local time, when the proximity occurred, the Airbus was passing 3,600 ft AMSL with a descent rate of 910 ft/min, a bank angle of 25°, a heading of 305°, an indicated airspeed of approximately 225 kt, and a nose attitude of approximately 3.6° up. The flight crew stated the sailplane was approximately 100 ft above and 50 to 100 m to the left of the Airbus, and that it was heading toward the Airbus. Flight data from both aircraft confirmed that the Airbus overtook the sailplane with a horizontal separation of approximately 56 m and a vertical separation of approximately 46 ft. The second sailplane was approximately 1.5 NM northwest of the incident location at the time. The Airbus continued its approach to runway 23 at Hamburg-Fuhlsbüttel, and the sailplane later landed at Lübeck-Blankensee. ## Aircraft and Equipment The Airbus A321-231 is a twin-engine, low-wing, turbofan-powered aircraft primarily used on short- and medium-haul routes, with a capacity of up to 200 passengers. It was registered in Germany and operated by a German air transport company. The aircraft was equipped with a Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), which can generate warnings based on received transponder signals and provide avoidance recommendations if necessary. The Rolladen-Schneider LS 4 is a single-seat composite sailplane. It did not have a transponder, which was not legally required. It was registered in Germany and operated by an air sports club. The sailplane was equipped with a FLARM collision warning device, which can warn of other aircraft if they are also equipped with FLARM. ## Meteorological and Airspace Information The 18:20 local time METAR for Hamburg-Fuhlsbüttel reported surface wind 290° at 4 kt (varying between 250° and 350°), visibility greater than 10 km, no significant cloud below 5,000 ft above ground, temperature 29°C, dew point 16°C, and QNH 1,020 hPa. The sun was approximately 270° at an elevation of 25° above the horizon. At the time of the proximity, both aircraft were in Class E airspace at approximately 3,600 ft AMSL. The lower limit of the overlying Class C airspace was 4,500 ft AMSL. Class E is controlled airspace in which both IFR and VFR flights may operate. IFR flights are separated from other IFR flights but not from VFR flights. Traffic information regarding VFR flights is provided to IFR flights where possible, and VFR flights also receive traffic information where possible. VFR weather minima included 5 km flight visibility (8 km above flight level 100) and 1.5 km horizontal and 1,000 ft vertical cloud clearance. Transponder use was mandatory for motor-powered aircraft above 5,000 ft AMSL, but not for the sailplane. ## Data Sources The Airbus was equipped with a flight data recorder (FDR), and the data were provided to the investigation by the air transport company. The air navigation service provider and the Bundeswehr provided radar data. The investigation also received FLARM flight data from the sailplane, which recorded altitude (AMSL), position, and ground speed at 2-second intervals. No recording or transcript of the radio communications between Bremen Radar and the Airbus was available to the investigation.