Aircraft Crash Near Saigon-Tan Son Nhat Runway 25 After Engine Failure and Sudden Weather Deterioration (F-BHHR)

Incident Overview and Initial Engine Failure Shortly after takeoff from Saigon-Tan Son Nhat Airport, the crew reported a failure of engine number 4 while climbing. The crew was cleared to return to the airport for a safe landing. At that time, visibility was estimated to be between 500 and 1,000 meters. ## Weather Deterioration and Go-Around Decision While returning to the airport, the crew was informed that weather conditions had deteriorated, with visibility reduced to 80 meters and strong winds. Under these conditions, the captain decided to attempt a go-around. During the maneuver, the aircraft banked right and crashed near the runway 25 threshold. ## Occupant Safety and Aircraft Damage All 28 occupants were evacuated safely. The aircraft was damaged beyond repair. ## Official Probable Cause and Contributing Factors The official findings indicated that the direct cause was mainly the sudden worsening of atmospheric conditions. The violence of the storm was localized in the approach of the squall and within the squall itself. Whirling winds, described as three-quarters front and then full cross, displaced the aircraft to the right despite the pilot's efforts. The pilot also felt that engine number 3 was not yielding full power. A subsequent downdraft and rain forced the aircraft down, causing it to lose altitude and reach the ground. The reapplication of power occurred late, at an altitude of approximately 250 to 300 feet and 25 to 30 seconds from the beginning of the runway. The findings noted that, in identical weather conditions, if the pilot had reapplied power as soon as he received the QBI and QAM (latest MET observation) he had requested from the tower, the aircraft would have been at an altitude of approximately 560 to 600 feet and one minute and twenty seconds from the runway, at a distance of 4 kilometers. This would have allowed the aircraft to meet the squall at higher altitude and speed conditions, avoiding being brought to the ground. Aggravating factors included the initial QBI announcement by the tower while the aircraft was at 1,500 feet in a rear wind. The pilot and radio operator stated they did not hear it at that time, but a playback of the recorded tape included the radio operator answering, “Aerodrome is QBI; all right.” Had the pilot known of the QBI condition then, he would probably have requested a QAM and been in a better position to make a prompt decision to reapply power. A second report of smoke, whose origin could not be detected on board, distracted the crew's attention from the controls for a fraction of a second, causing them to apprehend danger from the holds. The load was 660 kg heavier than that submitted by the company. The airline should have reweighed the baggage instead of relying on the weights shown on the packages and on the manifest drawn up and filed.