History of the Flight
On 7 October 2012, at approximately 2010 UTC, a Britten-Norman BN2A-26 Islander, registration VP-MON, operated by Montserrat Airways Limited doing business as Fly Montserrat, was on a VFR scheduled commercial air transport flight from V.C. Bird International Airport, Antigua (TAPA), to John A Osborne Airport, Montserrat (TRPG). The accident occurred during the aircraft's fourth sector of the day.
Prior to the accident flight, another pilot had flown two sectors in the aircraft. The accident pilot reported for duty at 1130 UTC, completed pre-flight preparations, and operated the aircraft to V.C. Bird. After arrival, the airport closed to VFR traffic due to cumulonimbus activity and heavy rain. The airport re-opened shortly before departure. A cumulonimbus cloud was present on the approach to Runway 07, and although the surface wind was westerly, Runway 07 was in use for departures.
On board were the pilot, three passengers, and bags weighing 150 lb. Fuel load on departure was 65 USG of AVGAS. The takeoff mass was shown on the loadsheet as 5,540 lb, below the structural maximum takeoff weight of 6,600 lb; the performance-regulated takeoff weight at 24 °C was greater than the structural limit.
The pilot called Ground Movement Control for permission to start engines and was instructed to wait while the controller contacted Montserrat ATC. The pilot then asked for surface wind and was informed it was from 240° at 10 kts. Permission for start was given, and the pilot was instructed to taxi to holding position Bravo. The pilot contacted the Tower controller and was instructed to enter, backtrack, and line up on Runway 07. The controller described the weather observed from the Tower, and the pilot requested a left-hand turn-out after departure. Surface wind was transmitted as from 270° at 10 kts, and the aircraft was cleared for takeoff.
The aircraft entered the runway at Bravo but did not backtrack. No power checks were carried out (other evidence indicated that power checks were routinely not carried out other than on each pilot's first flight of the day). The aircraft took off, and the early part of the climb appeared normal.
Eye witnesses observed the departure and accident sequence. Analysis of witness reports indicated that the normal climb continued to a height of between 200 and 300 ft above the ground. The aircraft then appeared to 'sink', losing height without yawing or rolling, before yawing to the right, then rolling to the right, and pitching nose down into an incipient spin to the right. The surviving passenger recalled that the stall warning sounded, and its red light illuminated throughout this period. Witnesses described the incipient spin continuing until the aircraft struck the ground.
ATC staff activated the airport's crash alarm. The rescue and fire-fighting service responded promptly.
Injuries to Persons
| Injuries | Crew | Passengers | Others | |----------|------|------------|--------| | Fatal | 1 | 2 | 0 | | Serious | 0 | 1 | 0 | | Minor/none | 0 | 0 | 0 |
The pilot and one passenger were fatally injured on impact. Another passenger succumbed to her injuries before extrication. The third passenger sustained serious injuries and was taken to hospital.
Damage to Aircraft
The aircraft was destroyed due to severe damage sustained by the forward fuselage and wing tips during impact.
Other Damage
None.
Personnel Information
The pilot was male, aged 31 years. He held a Commercial Pilots Licence issued by Transport Canada with ASSI validation, and a Transport Canada Category 1 medical certificate valid until 31 January 2013. His total flying experience was 710 hours, of which 510 were on type. In the last 28 days, he flew 25 hours; in the last 24 hours, 0.5 hours. His previous rest period was 64 hours.
The pilot obtained a Private Pilot's Licence in Antigua in 2008. He began training in Canada in 2009, obtaining a Canadian PPL and then a Commercial Pilot's Licence with Multi-Engine Piston and Instrument Ratings. His flight test reports included scores of 2 (major errors) for several exercises, including stall recovery, slipping, short field landing, en-route procedure, circuit, steep turn, approach with one engine inoperative, arrival, holding, and engine failure.
The pilot worked for the accident operator, then another Islander operator, before returning. At the other operator, he was a trainee pilot flying empty sectors with a training captain. The accountable manager described his performance as 'very inconsistent'.