What happened
A scheduled commuter flight, operating under night visual flight rules, departed 40 minutes behind schedule for a multi-stop itinerary. During the initial leg of the journey, worsening weather conditions at the primary destination prompted the pilot to divert to a second destination airport. After receiving special VFR clearance from air route traffic control, the aircraft tracked directly toward the diversion airport.
As the aircraft approached the area, witnesses noted the presence of fog and ice. While the pilot attempted to activate pilot-controlled lighting at the airport, the request was transmitted on the air route traffic control frequency rather than the airport's frequency, meaning the lights were not activated. Ground observers noted that the airport lighting remained off as the aircraft flew over and continued away from the field. Approximately one mile from the runway, the aircraft began a descent and a right turn, resulting in controlled flight into terrain. The pilot maintained control of the aircraft until the moment of the descending turn. Following the impact, the aircraft was located by searchers approximately one hour later.
Findings
Investigation of the aircraft revealed no mechanical failures or engine anomalies that would have prevented normal flight. While roughly 3/4 inch of ice was found on unprotected surfaces of the empennage, the de-ice boots were functioning correctly, and structural icing was not considered a primary factor. The lack of runway lighting and reduced visibility from fog likely caused the pilot to lose situational awareness regarding the aircraft's position.
Organizational failures were also identified. Although the flight was assigned a risk level of 2 due to night, instrument meteorological conditions, and contaminated runways, the flight coordinator and the pilot did not discuss the specific risks associated with the flight. Furthermore, the flight coordinators had not received training on the company's risk assessment program. Additionally, regulatory oversight was noted as insufficient, as previous FAA inspections had identified various deficiencies in the operator's training and operational control procedures that remained unaddressed.