Background
The aircraft arrived at Helsinki–Vantaa airport at 02:47 on Monday, 31 January 2005. After landing, the pilot taxied to apron number four in the southeastern corner of the aerodrome and unloaded cargo from Sweden. The pilot then left the airport and rested in a company suite before the planned return flight to Sweden that afternoon. The company normally operated the aircraft with a two-person crew, but the co-pilot had taken ill, and the pilot flew the inbound leg alone. The return leg was also planned as a one-person crew flight.
Preflight Activities
The following morning, the aircraft was refueled with 420 liters of Jet A-1, totaling approximately 725 kg of fuel for the return leg. The pilot checked in for duty at around 14:30. He then began brushing accumulated snow and frozen snow melt off the upper surfaces of the aircraft, noting a great deal of snow and ice. The cargo intended for Skavsta did not arrive in time, so the pilot changed the destination to Örebro, which was better for follow-on transport. The pilot had outdated meteorological information for the return leg, and the operational flight plan form was inadequately filled. It was inadvertently filed for another tail number, and information such as date, crew, upper winds, waypoint estimates, fuel calculations, and pilot signatures were omitted. No copy of the operational flight plan was left for ground crew. A weight and balance calculation had been correctly computed but was left in the ground handling service’s briefing room, not in the cockpit. The pilot did not have access to the latest aeronautical information for the return leg; printouts from the inbound leg were found in the cockpit of the wreckage.
Takeoff and Accident
At 16:52:45, the pilot acknowledged on Helsinki Control Tower frequency 118.600 MHz that he was taxiing to takeoff position Runway 22L at intersection Y. At 16:54:40, the tower gave takeoff clearance and wind information. The pilot later stated that he executed a normal takeoff using 10 degrees of flaps, with liftoff at 80–90 knots. At 16:56:05, the pilot called the tower once. According to the pilot, everything went well until reaching 800–1000 feet (250–300 m), at which point he retracted the trailing edge flaps. Immediately after flap retraction, he lost control of the aircraft, which began turning right. The pilot attempted to fly to the end section of runway 22R for an emergency landing. Shortly before crashing to the right side of the extension of runway 22L, he managed to level the wings. He lost consciousness in the crash.
Investigation Findings
The investigation found that the chain of events began when the aircraft stood overnight on the tarmac, exposed to weather. Snowfall accumulated on the upper surfaces of the fuselage, wings, and stabilizers, forming a thick coat of ice and snow as it partly melted during the day and refroze as temperatures dropped toward evening. The pilot noticed the impurities during a walkaround check but did not order de-icing. Instead, he attempted to remove ice with a brush, which can only remove dry and loose snow. The frozen water that had trickled down remained stuck to surfaces. The aircraft took off with fundamentally degraded aerodynamic properties due to impurities. During initial climb, immediately after flap retraction, airflow separated from the wing surface, and the pilot did not regain control. The pilot did not recognize the stall and did not act to recover, possibly due to insufficient training for such situations. Several factors affected the pilot's actions: ignorance or negligence regarding the effect of impurities, schedule pressure during preflight briefing (though a flight plan change eliminated the actual rush), and potentially financial considerations—the company had ordered de-icing at Helsinki–Vantaa only once during the previous winter season, despite regular flights to the airport. Processes were in place for preflight briefing and freight forwarding, but flight schedules with reference to the primary destination airport's opening times did not allow long delays. The flap setting was not proper for the circumstances, and when the stall occurred, the pilot did not execute effective corrective actions, such as resetting flaps or utilizing all available engine power. The flight being operated with only one crew member, contrary to normal operations, was considered a contributing factor.