Sequence of Events
The private pilot of a multi-engine airplane was conducting an instrument approach at night in visual meteorological conditions. Approximately 1.3 nautical miles from the final approach fix, the right engine experienced a total loss of power. The pilot continued the approach and notified air traffic control of the power loss about 1 minute and 13 seconds later. Subsequently, he reported being unable to activate the airport's pilot-controlled runway lighting. In his final transmission, the pilot stated he was over the airport and would "reshoot that approach." The last radar return showed the airplane at about 450 ft above ground level with a groundspeed of 72 knots. The airplane then impacted the ground in a steep, vertical nose-down attitude about half a nautical mile from the departure end of the runway.
Investigation Findings
Examination of the wreckage revealed that the landing gear and flaps were extended, and the right propeller was not feathered. Data from the airplane indicated that the pilot did not secure the right engine after the power loss; the left engine continued producing power until impact. The elevator trim tab was found in the full nose-up position, but this was likely caused by the empennage separating from the aft pressure bulkhead during impact. No mechanical malfunctions or failures were found that would have precluded normal operation.
Fuel Management
The airplane's fuel system held a total of 203 gallons, and fuel consumption calculations estimated about 100 gallons should have remained at the time of the accident. The right-wing locker fuel tank was intact and contained about 14 gallons of fuel. Fuel blight in the grass at the accident site likely emanated from the right-wing tip tank. The Pilot Operating Handbook (POH) specified that the 20-gallon wing locker fuel tanks should be used after 90 minutes of flight, but 14 gallons remained in the right-wing locker tank, indicating the pilot did not adhere to the POH fuel management procedures. It is possible that the pilot inadvertently moved the right fuel selector to the OFF or an intermediate position, or ran the right auxiliary fuel tank dry, leading to fuel starvation and total power loss of the right engine.
Landing and Go-Around
The published instrument approach procedure indicated that the runway was not authorized for night landings. The pilot likely intended to land, but elected to go-around when unable to activate the runway lights and see the runway environment. However, he did not retract the landing gear and flaps to reconfigure the airplane for climb. The airplane may have been unable to climb in that configuration, and during the attempted go-around, the pilot likely exceeded the airplane's critical angle of attack, resulting in an aerodynamic stall.
Airport Lighting
Postaccident testing of the airport's pilot-controlled lighting system found no anomalies. The published approach procedure listed the common traffic advisory frequency, which activates the lighting. The pilot may have missed this note or selected an incorrect frequency, preventing him from activating the lights. Additionally, the published approach procedure noted that the runway was not authorized for night landings, but the pilot gave no indication of planning to circle to an authorized runway.