9 fatalities

2001-08-25: Cessna 402 (N8097W) — Blackhwak International Airways — Marsh Harbour, Bahamas

Marsh Harbour, BahamasTakeoff (climb)

On August 25, 2001, a Cessna 402 (registration N8097W) operated by Blackhwak International Airways was involved in an aviation accident near Marsh Harbour, Bahamas during takeoff. 9 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: Findings and Probable Cause: - Aircraft overweight. Pilot did not determine if the aircraft was within operating limitations. The aircraft’s weight was estimated to be 941 lbs over the maximum allowable takeoff weight. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A).

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 1781202490Data APIEditorial standards

On August 25, 2001, a Cessna 402B (N8097W) operated by Blackhawk International Airways crashed shortly after takeoff from Marsh Harbour, Bahamas, killing all nine occupants, including singer Aaliyah. The pilot was unqualified and the aircraft was overweight.

Accident Overview

On August 25, 2001, a Cessna 402B aircraft, registration N8097W, operated by Blackhawk International Airways, departed Marsh Harbour International Airport in the Bahamas for a return flight to Opa Locka, Florida. The aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff, killing all nine occupants, including US singer Aaliyah Dana Haughton. The flight was conducted under Visual Flight Rules (VFR).

Operator and Pilot Issues

Blackhawk International Airways was authorized by the FAA as a single-pilot Part 135 operation, with Gilbert Chacón as the only authorized pilot. However, the pilot in command for this flight was Morales, who was not authorized by the FAA to fly for Blackhawk. The company had no authority to operate as a multi-pilot operation. Morales was reportedly hired two days prior to the accident.

Weight and Balance

The aircraft was estimated to be 941 lbs over the maximum allowable takeoff weight, with the center of gravity 4.4 inches aft of the maximum aft limit. The weight of an unrecovered bag was not included in calculations. The pilot failed to determine if the aircraft was within operating limitations; no evidence of a completed weight and balance report or load manifest existed.

Pilot Qualification and Logbook Falsification

Morales was not qualified under Part 135 for the aircraft. His logbook contained falsifications, including adding up to 1,000 hours to his total flight and multi-engine times, and falsifying day and night landings. He also misreported aircraft types and registration numbers to FAA databases.

Aircraft Configuration at Impact

Post-accident examination found the fuel selectors both selected to the right main tank, though impact damage may have altered positions. Trim tabs were found outside normal takeoff range: aileron trim full right, rudder trim left, elevator trim full nose down. Flaps were selected to 15°, while the Pilot's Operating Handbook specifies 0° for normal takeoff. However, impact damage may have affected these settings.

Maintenance and Regulatory History

No FAA enforcement actions or service difficulty reports existed for the accident aircraft. However, Blackhawk had four administrative actions, including a letter of correction for maintenance failures, failure to comply with manufacturer's recommended programs, lack of a qualified maintenance person, and use of unsanctioned repair techniques.

Witness Accounts

Witnesses reported an argument between the pilot and passengers about the number of passengers and baggage. Eight passengers boarded, with two large individuals (estimated 300 lbs each) seated in the rear. The pilot loaded the aircraft personally and had difficulty starting engines. Departure was at approximately 1845 EDT. The aircraft became airborne between 2,500 and 2,800 feet on a 5,000-foot runway, then climbed steeply to about 40 feet, banked left, pitched nose down, and impacted marshy terrain.

Flight Authorization

Blackhawk was not authorized by the Bahamas Aviation Authority to conduct commercial operations in the Bahamas. It is unknown whether a flight plan was filed or radio communications were established with ATC during the flight from Florida to the Bahamas.

Probable cause

Findings and Probable Cause: - Aircraft overweight. Pilot did not determine if the aircraft was within operating limitations. The aircraft’s weight was estimated to be 941 lbs over the maximum allowable takeoff weight. The weight of the un-recovered bag was not added to the weight and balance calculations. The center of gravity was estimated to be 4.4 inches aft of the maximum aft allowable center of gravity envelope). - Pilot Unqualified. Pilot was not qualified under Part 135 for the aircraft in which he was flying. - Documents Falsification. Pilot falsified logbook to reflect more flight time than he actually had accumulated. Review of pilot logbook revealed in several instances, pilot added as much as 1,000 hours to his total flight and multi engine times. Hundreds of day and night landings were falsified to meet qualification requirements. Pilot falsified aircraft information (types and registration numbers) reporting them to be Cessna C402 aircraft, when FAA database clearly lists the aircraft in question as aircraft other than Cessna C402. Pilot may not have completed a weight and balance report. (No evidence existed that showed he had completed a load manifest or weight and balance and performance calculations). Pilot failed to comply with prescribed Weight and Balance and Performance limitations in Pilot’s Operating Handbook. (The aircraft’s weight was estimated to be 941 lbs over the maximum allowable takeoff weight. The weight of the un-recovered bag was not added to the weight and balance calculations. The center of gravity was estimated to be 4.4 inches aft of the maximum aft allowable center of gravity envelope)). Pilot may not have followed “before takeoff” checklist in Pilot’s Operating Handbook. - Fuel Selectors: “Left Engine – Left Main Tank, Right Engine – Right Main Tank”. Field investigation immediately following the accident revealed both fuel tank selectors were found selected to the right main tank. The left fuel valve was found in the left position, though the cable was separated from the valve. Impact damage may have changed the pre-impact settings, thereby rendering the observed positions as unreliable. - Aircraft Flight Controls (secondary control surfaces – trim tabs) were found to be out of normal range required for takeoff. The aileron trim tab was found selected all the way to the right. The rudder trim tab was found selected to the left and the elevator trim tab was found in the full nose down position. Impact damage may have changed the pre-impact settings, thereby rendering the observed positions as unreliable. - According to Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH) normal takeoff is 0˚ flaps. (The flap selector handle was selected to 15˚with the indicator at approximately the 15˚position. The wing flap push rods were bent, indicating partial extension at impact). - Blackhawk International Airways was not authorized to assign this pilot as a pilot in command because they did not have the authority to use a second pilot. Blackhawk International Airways was authorized as a single pilot operation with Mr. Gilbert Chacon as the only authorized pilot. - Blackhawk International Airways reportedly hired Mr Morales two days prior to the fatal accident, although they did not have the authority to use a second pilot. Further, they did not exercise due diligence in ensuring pilot’s qualification prior to assigning duty as pilot in command. - There were no FAA reports of any enforcement actions or service difficulty reports against the fatal aircraft. However, the FAA did report four administrative actions against Blackhawk, three for technical violations and the most recent for maintenance failures. The agency issued a correction letter April 28, 2000, citing Blackhawk's failure to comply with manufacturer recommended maintenance programs and FAA programs for its aircraft's engines or other parts, Blackhawk failed to have a person in charge of maintenance with an appropriate certificate and used unsanctioned techniques and equipment for repairs. - Results of disassembly report confirms that no discrepancies existed that