Introduction
On an IFR air taxi flight from Oslo (ENGM) to Aarhus (EKAH), the flight was uneventful until the landing phase. The commander was the pilot flying, and the first officer was the pilot monitoring. En route, the crew set approach speeds and agreed to pull curtains to avoid passenger cabin lights if foggy at EKAH.
Approach Planning
During descent, the crew decided not to descend below FL170 if weather prevented an approach and landing at EKAH, proceeding instead to a pre-planned alternate, Billund (EKBI), 60 nautical miles southwest. At 22:09, the first officer contacted Aarhus Tower to obtain the latest weather report. The tower communicated expected landing on runway 10R, wind 140° 2 kt, meteorological visibility 250 m, RVR 900/750/400 m in fog patches, few clouds at 200 ft and 6500 ft, temperature 16°C, dewpoint 15°C, and QNH 1008 hPa. The first officer read back visibility as 2500 m. The crew discussed RVR values and agreed runway 10R was preferable. The commander briefed the ILS approach, including missed approach procedures. The first officer pulled the curtain.
Final Approach
At 22:20, Aarhus Approach instructed descent to 3000 ft on QNH 1008 hPa with radar vectors for an ILS approach to runway 10R. The crew performed the approach checklist and discussed fog patches. At 22:28, the controller instructed a right turn of 10°, descent to 2000 ft, and advised LVP in operation. The controller radar vectored the aircraft for a long final. At 22:31, the crew was cleared for the ILS approach. The commander armed the approach mode, set flaps to 15°, and while established on the localizer and leaving 2000 ft on the glideslope, obtained visual contact with the approach and runway lighting system through shallow fog. The first officer also noted the lights. The commander ordered gear down and flaps 35°. The aircraft was established on the ILS in landing configuration. At 22:32, the first officer reported established, and the controller cleared the aircraft to land with wind 150° 2 kt. The crew completed the final checklist; landing lights were on. The first officer observed two white and two red PAPI lights.
Accident Sequence
Passing approximately 1500 ft RH, the first officer reported visual contact with the lighting system and noted fog above the middle of the runway, with both the touchdown zone and runway end visible. At about 900 ft RH, the commander disengaged the autopilot. The aircraft was established on the ILS at a computed airspeed of about 128 kt. The first officer called "500 to minimum" at about 800 ft RH, and the commander confirmed runway in sight. The commander intended to touch down at the beginning of the runway by flying one dot below the glideslope but did not communicate this plan. The aircraft descended below the glideslope. The first officer asked whether to cancel potential EGPWS glideslope warnings; the commander confirmed. At approximately 500 ft RH, the SSFDR recorded cancellation of potential EGPWS warnings. The aural alert announced 500 ft. Airspeed was 125 kt, vertical speed about 700 ft/min, and glideslope deviation reached one dot below. The commander noted one white and three red PAPI lights. The first officer called "Approaching minimum," followed by "Minimums Minimums." Thrust reduced towards flight idle, and full-scale glideslope deviation was recorded. The commander called "Continue" and had visual contact. The first officer perceived that the commander had sufficient visual cues and did not make callouts on altitude or deviation. The commander noticed passing a white crossbar, a second white crossbar, then red lights, interpreting the red lights as the beginning of runway 10R and initiating the flare. The aircraft collided with the antenna mast of the LLZ for runway 28L, touched down in the grass RESA for runway 28L, and the nose landing gear collided with a near field antenna (LLZ for runway 28L) and collapsed. The aircraft ended up on runway 10R.
Post-Accident
Throughout the sequence, the air traffic controller in the tower had no visual contact due to fog. Upon full stop, the first officer reported "a crash landing" to Aars Tower. The controller was uncertain and asked for repetition. The cabin crew initiated an evacuation of passengers without instructions from the flight crew. The aircraft caught fire. The aerodrome firefighting services and area emergency dispatch centre were activated. Emergency procedures on ground were completed, and the aircraft was evacuated.