Flight Details
Two pilots and three passengers were onboard a visual flight rules cross-country flight. The preflight, departure, and cruise portions proceeded without incident. During the initial approach, the flight crew reported difficulty visually acquiring the airport and discussed traffic in the area while maneuvering around clouds. The airplane crossed a ridgeline at 710 ft above ground level, triggering a terrain awareness and warning system (TAWS) alert. The flight crew made several comments about the airplane flying too fast and allowed the airspeed to increase well above the reference speed (Vref) for the approach.
Approach and Landing
At 1535:57, about 1 minute 52 seconds before landing, the pilot pulled the throttles to idle, where they remained for the rest of the approach. In an attempt to slow the airplane, the pilot partially extended the speedbrakes below 500 ft agl, which is prohibited by the airplane flight manual (AFM). Five seconds before touchdown, the descent rate was 1,500 ft per minute (fpm), exceeding the AFM's maximum of 600 fpm. The airplane touched down at about 18 knots above Vref.
Upon touchdown, the pilot did not extend the speedbrakes as required by the landing checklist but attempted to deploy the thrust reversers immediately. The thrust reversers did not unlock because the airplane bounced and became airborne again before the command could execute, consistent with system design (thrust reversers unlock only when all three landing gear are on the ground). The airplane touched down four times total. On the third touchdown, after the second bounce, all three landing gear contacted the runway and the thrust reversers unlocked as previously commanded. The pilot then advanced the throttles to idle, which would normally stow the reversers, but the airplane bounced a third time and became airborne before stowage could occur. When airborne, system logic cut hydraulic power to the thrust reverser actuators, preventing stowage, and aerodynamic forces subsequently pulled the reversers open.
During the final airborne phase, the pilot attempted a go-around by advancing the throttles, but electronic engine controls prevented power increase because the thrust reversers were not stowed. On the fourth touchdown, the pilot attempted to land straight ahead; the airplane touched down hard, the right main landing gear collapsed, and the airplane departed the paved surface, coming to rest about 600 ft beyond the runway threshold. The passengers and crew evacuated through the main cabin door, and the airplane was destroyed in a post-accident fire.
Post-Accident Examination
A post-accident examination of the airplane systems, structure, powerplants, and landing gear found no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.
Findings
The airplane's approach was unstabilized: airspeed during approach and landing exceeded Vref, and the descent rate exceeded the maximum allowed for landing seconds before touchdown. Both pilot and copilot commented on the high speed several times. During short final, the pilot asked the copilot if he should go around, and the copilot responded "no." Though the copilot was the director of operations and the pilot's direct supervisor, the pilot stated the copilot's position did not influence his decisions as pilot-in-command. Neither pilot called for a go-around despite awareness of the unstabilized approach. At touchdown, the pilot failed to follow AFM guidance, using thrust reversers before speedbrakes. According to the manufacturer, the airplane could have stopped within available runway if it had not bounced and if speedbrakes and wheel brakes were used at the first touchdown. After the third touchdown, the pilot attempted a go-around, but the AFM prohibits touch-and-go landings after thrust reverser deployment. The FAA issued Information for Operators 17009 on the concept of a committed-to-stop (CTS) point; however, the director of operations was unaware of this concept.