History of the Flight
The pilot, a 20-year-old private pilot with 218 hours total (61 on type), was to deliver the Cirrus SR22 (N770CP) back to its home base after a 100-hour maintenance inspection at Gloucestershire. During pre-flight, he noted approximately 30 USG of fuel in the left tank and 35 USG in the right, and 7 quarts of fresh oil; fuel samples were clean. The pilot elected to fly from the right seat; his passenger, also a qualified private pilot but not Cirrus-experienced, occupied the left seat.
After taxiing to the holding point, the pilot performed a power check: each magneto produced a drop of about 60 rpm, and the engine idled smoothly at about 750 rpm. The Multi-Function Display (MFD) was set to the engine page. The pilot then entered the runway, increased power to 2,000 rpm against the brakes, verified correct engine indications, and released the brakes. Applying full throttle, the engine responded "flawlessly" and the MFD showed normal takeoff power. He rotated at 65 kt, retracted flaps at 85 kt, and accelerated to 100 kt for initial climb. Performance was normal until approximately 150 ft above airfield level (aal), when, as he reached to switch off the electric fuel pump, he heard a "loud metallic bang" and power reduced rapidly but smoothly.
The pilot pitched down to maintain safe speed, identified a potential landing field, and transmitted a MAYDAY call. Selection was complicated by a motorway and power lines. He considered deploying the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) but judged insufficient height. Trading speed for height, he stretched the glide to cross the motorway, avoiding bank due to stall awareness. The aircraft struck a tree, causing heavy deceleration, and landed heavily in a field in a fully-stalled condition.
The passenger sustained a spinal injury but was able to open his door and exit onto the wing. The pilot switched off services, including battery switches, but power remained; he then pulled all circuit breakers, removing power, and attended to the passenger. Other aircraft in the circuit assisted ATC in locating the accident site, and the Aerodrome Fire and Rescue Service (AFRS) and other emergency responders arrived promptly. The pilot had not switched the fuel selector off or reinstalled the safety pin in the CAPS rocket assembly, but AFRS personnel completed these tasks under his guidance.
Witness Observations
An experienced air traffic controller heard a change in engine sound as the aircraft crossed the runway numbers, describing an "instantaneous loss of power" with no gradual throttling back like a practice engine failure. He reported no "popping or banging" following the change and estimated the aircraft height in excess of 150 ft aal when the note changed. Another controller on duty described the engine noise as winding down to nothing, cautiously estimating the height at about 80 ft aal.
Engineering Examination
The aircraft had substantial damage and was declared beyond economic repair. All three landing gear collapsed, and the three propeller blades were bent, indicating rotation but not under significant power. The wings were cut off for road transport to the AAIB.
After consultation with aircraft and engine manufacturer representatives, a replacement propeller was fitted and the engine was test-run. The fuselage was strapped to a trailer with a jury-rigged fuel supply using fuel drained from the accident aircraft. Damaged silencers were removed and a fuel leak from the gascolator drain was rectified. The engine started and ran at idle normally, then was accelerated to full power for about 10 minutes with manufacturer representatives monitoring the parameters. No abnormalities were observed during the test run.
Analysis
The flight was unremarkable until the pilot reached to switch off the fuel pump. Although he recalled not moving the switch before the power reduction, the possibility exists that he did select the fuel pump off, which might have caused power loss. The possibility that he inadvertently moved the throttle closed or turned the fuel selector off was also considered, but both individuals recollected this did not happen, and witnesses did not substantiate an attempt to restore power. Action by the pilot and emergency services to make the aircraft safe after the accident prevented validation of cockpit control positions. No conclusion regarding the engine failure was reached.