What happened
On 27 July 2009, a Cessna Citation 525, registration D-ITAN, departed London City Airport following a standard instrument departure procedure. The procedure required the aircraft to climb to and maintain 3,000 ft before further climbing. However, due to a misinterpretation of the air traffic control clearance, the crew believed they were cleared to climb directly to 4,000 ft. This error led the aircraft to climb through its required level-off altitude.
Simultaneously, a Boeing 777-300ER, registration TC-JJA, was operating a commercial flight on approach to Heathrow Airport. As D-ITAN climbed through 3,000 ft, it passed TC-JJA on a nearly reciprocal heading, with a vertical separation of only approximately 164 ft. The crew of D-ITAN observed the larger aircraft and managed to take evasive action, but the encounter posed a significant risk of collision.
The investigation
The investigation examined the communication between the London City Tower and the crew of D-ITAN, as well as the TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System) performance of both aircraft. It was established that while the controller corrected a minor omission in the pilot's readback, the incorrect altitude was not identified.
Data from radar installations and the flight path of TC-JJA were analyzed. The investigation found that TC-JJA experienced three TCAS Resolution Advisories (RAs) in rapid succession. The crew of TC-JJA did not follow the initial descent commands, and the controller's attempt to assist by suggesting a climb to 5,000 ft actually conflicted with the active 'increase descent' RA. Furthermore, the investigation noted that D-ITCA was not equipped with TCAS II, which prevented the coordinated avoidance maneuvers that would typically occur between two such equipped aircraft.
Findings
- The primary cause was the crew's misinterpretation of the ATC clearance, leading them to climb through the 3,000 ft step-climb altitude.
- The controller failed to notice the incorrect altitude readback by the crew of D-ITAN.
- The high rate of climb required by the departure procedure reduced the window of time available for the controller to detect the altitude deviation.
- The TCAS encounter was not resolved by the automated systems because D-ITAN lacked TCAS II capability, and the crew of TC-JJA did not respond to the initial descent RAs in a timely manner.
- The use of incorrect phraseology by the crew of TC-JJA delayed the controller's awareness of the TCAS event.