What happened
On October 29, 2020, a PA-34, registration HK5096G, was operating a private flight from Pereira to Guaymaral. The flight plan included Mariquita as the first alternate and Perales Airport in Ibagué as the second alternate. During the flight, the pilot encountered poor weather conditions at the primary destination and the first alternate, prompting a request to divert to Perales Airport.
At the time, Perales Airport was closed due to runway maintenance, as specified in an active NOTAM. However, the air traffic controller at the Bogotá Flight Information Center (FIC-B/OG) incorrectly informed the pilot that the airfield was operating as an uncontrolled airport. The pilot subsequently landed at the closed airfield at approximately 07:52 local time. After the aircraft was on the ground, the pilot learned that the original destination was now under visual flight rules (VMC) and departed for Guaymaral at 08:52 local time.
Later that morning, a second aircraft, a B190 with registration PNC0238, requested information while flying toward Mariquita. The controller, repeating the same operational error, informed this crew that Perales Airport was operating as an uncontrolled field. The B190 crew followed the instructions and landed at the closed airfield at approximately 14:44 UTC. No injuries or aircraft damage were reported in either instance.
The investigation
The GRIAA investigation examined the communication between the aircraft and the Bogotá Flight Information Center, as well as the flight planning processes of both crews. The investigation established that the controller at the FIC-BOG position had misread the NOTAM, initially confusing the validity dates and subsequently misinterpreting the "closed" status of the airport as an "uncontrolled" status.
Furthermore, the investigation found that the controller lacked the necessary technological resources to efficiently check current NOTAMs, as they were forced to rely on printed documents rather than a computer system. The investigation also noted that the controller was working with an expired recurrent training course. Regarding the flight crews, the investigation found that both pilots failed to independently verify the status of their alternate aerodromes by consulting the active NOTAMs during their flight planning.
Findings
- Human error in flight planning by both crews, as they failed to consult active NOTAMs for their designated alternate airports.
- Human error by the air traffic controller, who misread the NOTAM and incorrectly communicated the operational status of the airfield.
- Inadequate technological resources at the FIC-BOG workstation, preventing agile and updated NOTAM verification.
- Lack of proficiency and updated training, as the controller was operating with an expired recurrent course.
- Lack of clarity in the interpretation of aeronautical information, leading to the confusion between a closed airfield and an uncontrolled airfield.