Flight History
Flight 4-2 was the second section of a regularly scheduled cargo flight that departed Fort Lauderdale, Florida, on April 5, 1952, at 0055. The crew consisted of Captain William B. Crockett, Jr., and Copilot Jack L. Woerderhoff. The aircraft's intended destination was Teterboro, New Jersey, with intermediate stops at Charleston, South Carolina, and Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina. Upon departure, the gross weight was less than the maximum allowable of 48,000 pounds, and the center of gravity was within prescribed limits.
The first segment, conducted under visual flight rules, was routine, with a landing at Charleston at 0328. Fuel was added but no cargo was loaded or discharged. Takeoff from Charleston occurred at 0410 under an instrument flight rules flight plan. Again, the gross weight and center of gravity were within limits. This segment was also routine, with a landing at Raleigh-Durham at 0524. There, 284 gallons of fuel were added, and the cargo remained unchanged.
Approach and Missed Attempt
At Raleigh-Durham, the crew received a weather briefing indicating no difficulty en route to the New York area, but ceilings and visibilities at New York and the alternate, Philadelphia, were forecast to be 800 feet and five miles with heavy rain upon arrival. At 0554, the crew filed an IFR flight plan to cruise at 3,000 feet to New York International Airport (Idlewild), changing from Teterboro due to worsening weather there. The alternate was Philadelphia International Airport. The estimated time en route was two hours and ten minutes, and the aircraft carried fuel for four hours.
Departing Raleigh-Durham at 0608, the aircraft weighed 172 pounds less than the maximum allowable. The flight proceeded uneventfully at 3,000 feet, with routine position reports. At 0809, Air Route Traffic Control instructed the flight to climb to 3,500 feet and contact Idlewild Approach Control when over Scotland Intersection. The flight reported over Scotland at 3,500 feet at 0817 and was given Idlewild weather: measured ceiling 500 feet broken, 1,800 feet overcast, visibility 1.5 miles in heavy rain.
The approach controller, seeing the flight on radar, cleared it for a straight-in approach and instructed it to descend immediately. The flight acknowledged and reported leaving 2,500 feet and then 2,000 feet. The controller cleared the flight to continue descent, to advise upon reaching 1,500 feet, and then cleared it to "pass over Runway 4 and make left turn into Runway 13 left." At 0825, the flight reported "contact" over the outer marker. The local controller then advised the flight to "bear left and make a right turn into Runway 13L," and to call base leg when coming up on the Federal Building.
At 0827, the local controller saw the aircraft below the overcast at an estimated altitude of 500 feet, between the tower and Runway 4. He transmitted instructions for a left turn into Runway One Three. The landing gear appeared fully extended, but the flap position was not noted. The aircraft then disappeared from view on a northerly heading. When asked if it had started the left turn, the flight replied that it was pulling up to execute a missed approach. The tower instructed the flight to turn right and proceed to Long Beach intersection at 1,500 feet, which was acknowledged. This was the last communication.
The aircraft crashed at the intersection of 169th Street and 89th Avenue, Jamaica, New York, about 4.4 miles north of the Idlewild control tower.
Probable Cause
The Board determined that the probable cause of this accident was loss of control following sudden engine failure caused by a deteriorated fuel feed valve diaphragm during an attempted missed approach. The following findings were noted: the flight was given local weather with a measured ceiling of 500 feet and visibility of one and one-half miles, which were the minimums for the flight; the captain elected not to follow the tower's suggestions due to limited forward visibility; during power application for a missed approach, the fuel feed valve diaphragm of the left engine either completely failed or an existing failure worsened; this diaphragm had not been replaced at the time of engine overhaul, as required; the left engine then acted erratically with surging and intermittently cutting out; the flight was on instruments in turbulent air; control was lost and the aircraft descended rapidly in a sharply nose-down right slip, taking on aspects of a spin, and crashed.