5 fatalities

2007-07-24: De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver (N995WA) — Taquan Air — Ketchikan, United States of America

Ketchikan, United States of AmericaFlight

On July 24, 2007, a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver (registration N995WA) operated by Taquan Air was involved in an aviation accident near Ketchikan, United States of America in flight. 5 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilot's decision to continue under visual flight rules into an area of instrument meteorological conditions. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A).

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 1781198022Data APIEditorial standards

An air taxi floatplane crashed in mountainous terrain in southeast Alaska after the pilot continued flight into instrument meteorological conditions. The NTSB found no mechanical issues and cited inadequate weather evaluation and FAA surveillance as contributing factors.

Accident Overview

A float-equipped airplane operating as an air taxi on an air tour flight crashed in a remote, mountainous area of southeast Alaska. The aircraft was the second of three airplanes on the tour. The first pilot reported low clouds, rain, and fog, descending to 700 feet mean sea level to maintain visual flight rules (VFR) conditions. The third pilot, flying about five minutes behind the accident airplane, encountered a "wall of weather" that blocked his intended route, prompting him to turn around. The wreckage of the accident airplane was found fragmented in steep, tree-covered terrain at an elevation of approximately 2,500 feet msl, near the area where the third airplane turned back.

Investigation Findings

Postaccident inspections by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) revealed no mechanical problems with the airplane. A weather study conducted by the NTSB indicated that instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) existed in the area at the time of the accident. Photographs recovered from a passenger's camera depicted deteriorating weather conditions as the flight progressed.

Regulatory and Oversight Context

Nine days before the accident, a charter boat captain who had observed numerous float-equipped tour airplanes operating in adverse weather contacted the local Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Flight Standards District Office (FSDO) to report his sightings. According to the FAA, no specific tour operator could be identified during their ensuing investigation, and no enforcement actions or additional surveillance of any operators were initiated. The FSDO manager stated that the office had lost inspectors due to downsizing and had not attempted to observe operators' adherence to weather minimums via ground-based viewing locations along heavily traveled tour routes. He also noted that FAA inspectors used to purchase air tour tickets for en route, on-board surveillance but had not done so for approximately the last 10 years, and additional inspector assistance from other FAA offices was not requested.

Probable Cause

The NTSB determined that the probable cause of the accident was the pilot's decision to continue under VFR into an area of IMC. Contributing to the accident were the pilot's inadequate weather evaluation and the FAA's inadequate surveillance of the commercial air tour operator.