No fatalities

Floatplane Training Accident on River Results in Injuries (C-FJOQ)

Golden, CanadaTakeoff (climb)

On October 1, 1986, a De Havilland DHC-2 Beaver (registration C-FJOQ) operated by Amiskwi Air was involved in an aviation accident near Golden, Canada during takeoff. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilot, although experienced in the operation of wheel-equipped aircraft, had limited experience with aircraft on floats. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A).

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 2026-06-11Data APIEditorial standards

During solo floatplane training, a pilot porpoised on take-off from a river, struck the bank, and overturned. The seriously injured pilot was rescued. Investigation cited limited float experience and unsuitable river conditions.

Accident Overview

A pilot, under the supervision of his employer/instructor, was practicing solo take-offs and landings to qualify for a float endorsement. During a take-off attempt from a river, the aircraft began to porpoise. It momentarily cleared the water with the left float, then the right float, swerved left, and struck the river bank in a level attitude. The aircraft rolled and came to rest partially submerged on its left side. A fire started in the engine compartment but lasted only a short time. The seriously injured pilot was rescued by the aircraft owner, who swam across the river.

Investigation Findings

The pilot, though experienced in wheel-equipped aircraft, had limited experience with floats. His solo flying time on float-equipped aircraft was less than one hour, all from the same location the day before the accident. The river flowed at approximately five knots in the take-off direction. The water level was low, exposing sand bars above and just below the surface. As a result, the average usable width of the river for take-offs and landings was less than 100 feet. The river had a prominent bend where the aircraft commenced its take-off and another just downstream of the occurrence site. The left riverbank, in the direction of take-off, was lined with tall trees up to the water's edge.

Restraint System and Injuries

The pilot's lap belt had a sliding friction-type buckle that loosened during the crash, and there was no shoulder harness installed. The source notes that the pilot would likely have suffered less serious injuries with a better restraint system.

Contributing Factors Identified

Although the pilot had successfully taken off and landed on the river the day before, the conditions were unsuitable for his limited float-flying experience. When directional control could not be established during the take-off, a prudent decision would have been to abort rather than continue. The supervising pilot should have recognized that the river conditions were unsuitable as a practice area for any pilot, particularly one with limited float experience.

Probable cause

The pilot, although experienced in the operation of wheel-equipped aircraft, had limited experience with aircraft on floats. His solo flying experience on float-equipped aircraft was less than one hour and was from the same location the day before the accident. The river flowed at about five knots in the direction of take-off. The water level of the river was low, and, as a result, sand bars were both above and just below the water surface. Because of these conditions, the average usable width of the river for take-offs and landings was less than 100 feet. The river had one prominent bend in the area where the aircraft commenced its take-off and another just downstream of the occurrence site. The riverbank on the left, in the direction of take-off, had tall trees up to the water's edge. The pilot suffered injuries during the crash; the lap belt had a Sliding friction-type buckle that loosened during the crash, and there was no shoulder harness installed in the aircraft. It is probable that the pilot's injuries would have been less serious if he had had a better restraint system. Although the pilot had successfully taken off and landed on the river the day before the accident, the conditions of that area were unsuitable for his limited float-flying experience. When the pilot could not establish directional control during the take-off, a prudent decision would have been to reject, rather than to continue. The supervising pilot should have realized that the conditions of the river were not suitable as a practice area for any pilot, particularly for a pilot whose float-flying experience was limited.