Flight History
Speed Air 960, a pilot self-dispatched non-scheduled cargo flight, operated from Goose Bay to Davis Inlet, Newfoundland, under a defence visual flight rules flight plan. Before departure, the captain obtained weather information from the St. John's flight service station via telephone and fax. The aircraft departed at 0815 Atlantic standard time, with the captain as pilot flying.
Approach Procedures
During the first approach, the first officer had occasional visual glimpses of snow on the surface. The captain descended to the minimum descent altitude of 1340 feet above sea level. When the crew did not acquire the required visual references at the missed approach point, they executed a missed approach.
On the second approach, the captain flew outbound from the beacon at 3000 feet asl until turning inbound. The crew decided that if visual contact with the surface was made at any time during the approach, they would continue below the MDA in anticipation of required visual references. The captain initiated a constant descent at approximately 1500 feet per minute with 10 degrees of flap. The first officer occasionally glimpsed the surface. At MDA, in whiteout conditions, the captain continued the descent. The first officer acquired visual ground contact 16 seconds before impact, and the captain did so 8 seconds before impact. At that point, the crew selected maximum propeller revolutions per minute.
Impact and Wreckage
The aircraft struck the ice in controlled flight two nautical miles from the airport. During both approaches, the aircraft encountered airframe icing. The crew used wing de-ice, which functioned normally by removing the ice. The wreckage pattern was consistent with a controlled, shallow descent. The emergency locator transmitter was damaged by impact forces and rendered inoperable.
Probable Cause Findings
The official investigation identified the following causes and contributing factors: 1) The captain decided to descend below the minimum descent altitude without the required visual references. 2) After descending below MDA, both pilots were preoccupied with acquiring and maintaining visual contact with the ground and did not adequately monitor the flight instruments; thus, the aircraft flew into the ice.
Additional findings included that the flight crew were certified and qualified, the aircraft operated in instrument meteorological and icing conditions, no airframe failure or system malfunction occurred, the de-icing system was serviceable, an ice-contaminated tailplane stall did not occur, fuel weight was not properly recorded in the journey logbook, and the aircraft departed approximately 500 pounds overweight.