4 fatalities

1995-06-09: De Havilland DHC-8-100 (Dash-8) (ZK-NEY) — Ansett New Zealand - ANZ — Palmerston North, New Zealand

Palmerston North, New ZealandLanding (descent or approach)

On June 9, 1995, a De Havilland DHC-8-100 (Dash-8) (registration ZK-NEY) operated by Ansett New Zealand - ANZ was involved in an aviation accident near Palmerston North, New Zealand during landing or approach. 4 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The captain not ensuring the aircraft intercepted and maintained the approach profile during the conduct of the non-precision instrument approach, the captain's perseverance with his decision to get the undercarriage lowered without discontinuing the… This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A).

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 1781207940Data APIEditorial standards
Aircraft registered ZK-NEY
Aircraft registered ZK-NEY. Photo: Christopher Redford on Flickr (Original version) / CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Ansett New Zealand Flight 703, a Dash 8, collided with terrain during a VOR/DME approach to Palmerston North after a landing gear malfunction and deviation from the approach profile.

Flight Details

At 08:17, Ansett New Zealand Flight 703 departed Auckland (AKL) as scheduled, bound for Palmerston North (PMR). The aircraft was a Dash 8.

Approach

To the north of Palmerston North, the pilots briefed for a VOR/DME approach to runway 07, their preferred approach. Air Traffic Control subsequently specified the VOR/DME approach for runway 25 due to departing traffic, so the pilots re-briefed for that instrument approach. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, with the aircraft flying in and out of stratiform cloud; continuous cloud occurred during most of the approach. The aircraft was flown accurately to join the 14 nautical mile DME arc, then turned right to intercept the final approach track of 250° magnetic to the Palmerston North VOR. During the right turn, the power levers were retarded to flight idle. Shortly afterward, the first officer advised the captain, "....12 DME looking for 4000 (feet)." The final approach track was intercepted at approximately 13 DME and 4700 feet, and the first officer advised Ohakea Control that "Ansett 703" was "established inbound."

Landing Gear Malfunction

Just prior to 12 miles DME, the captain called for gear down. The first officer asked him to repeat and then responded, "OK selected and on profile, ten - sorry hang on 10 DME we're looking for four thousand aren't we so - a fraction low." The captain said, "Check, and Flap 15." This was not acknowledged, but the first officer said, "Actually no, we're not, ten DME we're..... (the captain whistled at this point) look at that." The captain noticed that the right hand main gear had not locked down, stating, "I don't want that." The first officer replied, "No, that's not good is it, so she's not locked, so Alternate Landing Gear...?" The captain acknowledged and said, "Alternate extension, you want to grab the QRH?" After the first officer's affirmative, the captain continued, "You want to whip through that one, see if we can get it out of the way before it's too late." The captain then said, "I'll keep an eye on the airplane while you're doing that." The first officer located the "Landing Gear Malfunction Alternate Gear Extension" checklist in Ansett New Zealand's Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) and began reading it. He started with the first check, but the captain told him to skip through some checks. The first officer responded and resumed reading and carrying out the necessary actions. It was the operator's policy that all items on the QRH checklists be actioned or proceeded through as directed by the captain. The first officer started carrying out the checklist, and the captain advised him to pull the Main Gear Release Handle.

Collision

Then the Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) audio alarm sounded. Almost five seconds later, the aircraft collided with terrain. The Dash 8 collided with the upper slope of a low range of hills.

Probable cause

The captain not ensuring the aircraft intercepted and maintained the approach profile during the conduct of the non-precision instrument approach, the captain's perseverance with his decision to get the undercarriage lowered without discontinuing the instrument approach, the captain's distraction from the primary task of flying the aircraft safely during the first officer's endeavours to correct an undercarriage malfunction, the first officer not executing a Quick Reference Handbook procedure in the correct sequence, and the shortness of the ground proximity warning system warning.