Incident Overview
On 23 February 2010, a DHC-8-402 Dash 8, registration G-FLBD, operated by an airline on a commercial passenger flight from Athens Airport to Chania Airport, Crete, experienced a serious incident during the final approach. The aircraft was carrying 5 crew and 50 passengers; no injuries and no damage were reported.
Flight History
The flight was scheduled to serve as the commander's annual line check, with a Line Training Captain (LTC) occupying the jump seat. Due to a communications issue, the LTC cancelled the check before departure. The aircraft departed approximately 10 minutes behind schedule.
During the transit at FL190, the commander briefed for a VOR/DME approach to Runway 11. The weather was CAVOK with calm wind. The commander planned a visual approach but did not mention the displaced threshold in the briefing.
Crew Actions
On final approach, the commander (pilot flying) and co-pilot forgot about the displaced threshold, which moved the touchdown point 800 metres inwards due to runway resurfacing. The LTC became concerned and intervened late in the approach. At the same time, the commander realised the error and increased power to adjust the flight path. The aircraft touched down safely at the correct displaced threshold point and taxied to the terminal.
Airport Information
The NOTAM for Chania Airport stated the first 800 metres of Runway 11 were unserviceable, with closed runway markings. The displaced threshold was equipped with threshold lights, side lights, end lights, and PAPIs. The ATIS (Information HOTEL) included the reduced runway length and new threshold location. The crew did not recall hearing this information on the ATIS, and ATC did not remind them. The closed markings did not stand out in bright sunlight, and the crew did not remember the PAPIs being illuminated.
Analysis
The crew did not recall hearing the ATIS information regarding the displaced threshold. The commander conducted a normal visual approach using VOR/DME crosschecks. His late adjustment ensured a safe landing, though a go-around might have been a better option. The LTC, as a third crew member, should assist in identifying incorrect practices at the earliest opportunity.