History of the Flight
At 0653 hrs, before daylight, G-ECOO requested and received permission from ATC to push back and start from Stand 9, to face north and hold south of Bravo One Taxiway. This non-standard pushback allowed a Jetstream 41 on Stand 11 to taxi out via Bravo One to Runway 02. The pushback was completed without incident; the tug was disconnected and all personnel and equipment cleared. One minute later, the Jetstream 41 powered back from Stand 11 and stopped on Taxiway Alpha abeam Stands 10 and 11.
When G-JEDO requested permission to push back and start from Stand 6, ATC instructed it to standby. The Jetstream 41 was then given permission to taxi. G-JEDO subsequently received clearance for a standard pushback to face south from Stand 6. At the time, G-ECOO was stationary on the taxiway.
During G-JEDO’s pushback, the headset operative asked the commander to confirm the brakes were off, then reported they could not push the aircraft any further and requested the brakes be set. A passing Airside Operations vehicle reported an aircraft-to-aircraft conflict on Stand 6. G-ECOO transmitted that they felt a bump and asked if they had been hit. After photographic evidence was acquired, both aircraft were pulled back onto stand.
Damage
G-JEDO sustained damage to its right elevator; G-ECOO sustained damage to its tail cone.
Ground Crew Procedures
Operating procedures required the headset operative to stand on the side of the aircraft where the headset was plugged in, which for the Dash 8 was the left side – the outside of the turn during this pushback. The tug was fitted with a radio tuned to the Tower frequency for monitoring. The wingman’s role was to stop traffic behind the aircraft before pushback.
G-JEDO’s headset operative stated they were aware of G-ECOO and were not convinced the pushback could be completed safely, but feeling under pressure, they commenced the pushback. During the pushback, the headset operative lost sight of G-ECOO about three-quarters of the way along the stand and did not squat down to see its position. G-ECOO came back into sight as the aircraft was being straightened; the headset operative was considering stopping when the collision occurred.
The tug driver stated he usually listened to ATC transmissions but did not recall doing so on this occasion. He had seen G-ECOO before pushing and thought there was enough room, but he did not monitor G-ECOO’s relative position during the pushback.
The wingman stated the headset operative did not indicate which way the aircraft should face. Aware of G-ECOO, he assumed G-JEDO would face north. He left for other duties as the aircraft cleared the road, before it began turning south.
ATC Comments
The ATCO stated that when clearance was given, G-ECOO was stationary on the taxiway and there appeared to be space for G-JEDO’s pushback. He could see G-ECOO but not its position relative to paint markings on the taxiway.
Discussion
The ATCO gave G-JEDO pushback clearance before G-ECOO had taxied to Holding Point Bravo One and cleared Taxiway Alpha, believing there was enough space. He did not transmit information relating to G-ECOO’s position, which might have improved pilots’ situational awareness.
The headset operative accepted the instruction to face south, as did the tug driver, and pushed G-JEDO into the stationary G-ECOO.
Safety Actions
As a result of this incident, ATC, the airport operator, and the aircraft handling agent will implement new pushback procedures and new holding points. ATC will introduce procedures that do not permit aircraft to push back in proximity to each other, and will review taxi clearances and holding points to ensure non-standard manoeuvres are removed. The operator has amended the Quick Reference Handbook to indicate the location of written procedures for preserving CVR and FDR recordings.