Background
The Douglas DC-8-63F, registration YA-VIC, operated by a Kabul-based cargo airline, was involved in an incident on 11 August 2010 at Manston Airport (Kent International). The aircraft, manufactured in 1970 and powered by four Pratt & Whitney JT3D-7 turbojet engines, was on a commercial cargo flight transporting 36 polo ponies from Manston to Buenos Aires, Argentina, with a refuelling stop in Cape Verde. This was the first revenue flight for the operator's DC-8 fleet. The aircraft had arrived from Ras Al Khaimah, UAE, the previous day with two three-man flight crews.
History of Flight
The operating crew reported for duty at 0600 hrs for a planned 0800 hrs departure, but delays occurred due to late arrival and loading of the ponies. The commander was occupied with dispatch issues and obtaining route charts. Fuel planning initially called for 37,000 litres, but the flight engineer later revised this to 61,000 litres, eventually delivering 61,801 litres. The load and trim form indicated a takeoff weight of 335,410 lb, but the takeoff data card showed 343,000 lb with corresponding speeds. No crosscheck was performed. Post-incident analysis calculated the actual takeoff weight as 343,046 lb, exceeding the maximum runway-limited takeoff weight by approximately 25,700 lb.
The aircraft departed the stand at 1028 hrs with the commander as handling pilot. On board were three operating crew, three positioning crew, and six grooms and veterinarians. Weather was fine with a surface wind from 290° at 7 kt, temperature 20°C, and a dry runway.
Takeoff and Tail Strike
The takeoff run was observed by airport staff who noted slow acceleration. Rotation was initiated near the end of Runway 28, and a cloud of debris was seen as the aircraft lifted off. The commander reported feeling two jolts and suspected a tail strike. A scrape mark was left on the runway, extending 117.5 m, including a 24.6 m mark on the paved surface, a gap where a centreline approach light was destroyed, and a 30 m trench in soft ground beyond. The width and nature of the marks were consistent with contact by the tail skid sole plate and the right main landing gear.
Aftermath
Manston ATC reported the suspected tail strike to London ATC, who relayed it to the commander. With aircraft systems appearing normal, the commander continued the flight to Cape Verde. An inspection there revealed ground contact marks on the tail skid, with the energy absorber deformed by 7/16 inch, within the maintenance limit of 1/2 inch. No other damage was noted. The aircraft proceeded to Buenos Aires, where the shock absorber was replaced.
Investigation Findings
The investigation identified procedural failures by the flight crew, including lack of crosschecking and non-adherence to performance calculations. The commander and flight engineer had no recent flying hours on type. Additionally, the investigation noted a lack of operational oversight and control by the aircraft operator and the Afghan regulatory authority. Four Safety Recommendations were made.
Recorded Data Analysis
Flight data recorder information showed rotation started at 159 kt IAS. The aircraft pitched to a maximum of 15.2°, exceeding the tail strike warning of 8.95° pitch. Engine pressure ratios were below target during rotation except on one engine, increasing after lift-off.