What happened
On 6 November 2002, a Fokker 27 Mk050, registered LX-LGB, departed Berlin for Luxembourg. While operating flight LG 9642/LH 2420 at a cruising altitude of FL180, the crew received instructions from Frankfurt Control to descend to FL90 and proceed toward Diekirch. Upon being transferred to Luxembourg Approach, the aircraft was directed into a holding pattern at FL90 with instructions for an ILS 24 approach.
During the descent, the aircraft was cleared to 3000ft QNH with a heading of 130 degrees. At this stage, the aircraft was flying above a fog layer, though visibility (RVR) was reported at only 275 meters. The crew had established a plan to execute a go-around if the RVR dropped below 300 meters while passing ELU. As the aircraft passed ELU at approximately 09:04, the controller reported an RVR of 300 meters. In response, the crew reduced power, selected flaps 10, and extended the landing gear.
Immediately following the gear extension, the pitch angle of both propellers dropped below minimum flight values, causing a rapid loss of airspeed and altitude. This resulted in the failure of both engines. The flight data recorders lost power as the engines stopped, and the aircraft disappeared from radar at 09:05:42. The wreckage was located in a field roughly 3.5 kilometers east of the runway threshold. The accident resulted in 16 fatalities and 6 critical injuries, though four of the injured later succumbed to their wounds. Only two individuals survived the impact.
Findings
Investigations concluded that the crew accepted an approach clearance for which they were not adequately prepared, specifically failing to prepare for a potential go-around. This lack of readiness led to uncoordinated and improvised cockpit actions. A critical error involved the unauthorized override of the primary stop on the power levers, which triggered the catastrophic propeller pitch change.
Several contributing factors were identified:
- The crew's focus on managing RVR values below company minima caused cockpit disorganization.
- Deviations from standard operating procedures and established manuals occurred during the approach.
- A psychological drive to complete the flight may have influenced the decision to deviate from protocols.
- Air traffic control prioritized sequence efficiency without considering the operational risks posed to the crew.
- A mechanical vulnerability existed due to the unreliable secondary stop safety device, which had not been addressed via a service bulletin.
- Organizational and regulatory shortcomings contributed to an environment where standard procedures were not strictly maintained.