On July 25, 2009, an Ilyushin II-62 (registration UP-I6208) operated by Aria Air was involved in an aviation accident near Mashhad, Iran during landing or approach. 16 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: Weak cockpit management between the crew, leading to the use of incorrect landing techniques, including the release of engine thrust reversers and engine shutdown at unsuitable times. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A).
On July 24, 2009, an Ilyushin Il-62M (UP-I6208) operated by DETA Airline for Aria Airline overshot a runway at Mashhad International Airport, killing 16 people.
Accident Overview and Immediate Response On July 24, 2009, an Ilyushin Il-62M aircraft, registration UP-I6208, operated by DETA Airline under an ACMI lease to Aria Airline, was on flight IRX1525. The aircraft departed Mehrabad International Airport in Tehran with 169 passengers on board and landed at 18:05 local time on Runway 13L at Mashhad International Airport. Following landing, the aircraft ran off the end of the runway without a significant reduction in speed and collided with an airport wall, coming to a stop after traveling approximately 185 meters. The airport's ground safety unit responded by breaking through protective fences and barbed wire to evacuate passengers and extinguish a fire outside the aircraft. The accident resulted in 16 fatalities, comprising 11 crew members and 5 passengers, while 30 other occupants were injured and all remaining occupants were rescued. ## Site Investigation and Physical Evidence The accident site was located at coordinates N 36,218º E 59,666º, on a road near the aerodrome, 1 kilometer from the Runway 31R threshold. The aircraft's final position had an azimuth of 125º true. The right wing destroyed a power line along the road, and fuel leaked from damaged right-wing fuel tanks. Main and emergency exits were open, and an inflatable slide had deployed from the port side. No evidence of fire on board or at the accident site was found. Intensive braking tracks were first observed on the concrete 550 meters from the Runway 31R departure threshold. The main gear tracks ran along the left part of the runway before diverging to the right beyond the threshold. A textile aerodrome emergency braking unit was found at the end of the braking way. The aircraft ran over the runway while moving along the right side of the 300-meter stopway. Beyond the runway end, gear tracks crossed a rough, partly grassed surface and a dirt road. A destroyed tire tube, presumably from the right gear front wheel, was found 100 meters from the runway end. Smashed approach lights were found at 160 meters and 320 meters from the runway end, with airframe structures and small debris pieces scattered along the path. A ditch 0.5 to 1 meter deep, containing an underground pipeline, was located 40 meters past the second line of destroyed approach lights. The southeastern part of the aerodrome was fenced with a 2.5-meter-high brick wall. The aircraft collided with this fence 820 meters from the departure threshold, 520 meters past the stopway end, with a heading of 105 degrees. The fence was destroyed over a 70-meter stretch. Debris from the nose, cockpit, passenger seats, and cabin parts was found behind the fence. After the collision, the aircraft continued moving for 160 meters before stopping on the road. ## Official Findings and Probable Cause The official investigation identified several contributing factors. The crew was not trained or familiar with flight conditions in Iranian territory, and Aria Airline's operation unit was found to have acted weakly in this regard. The approach speed was higher than recommended for the airport charts and aircraft weight, though it was considered controllable with corrective action. The crew failed to follow Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the Descend-Approach-Landing phase and lacked precise coordination regarding self-responsibility. They did not pay attention to EGPWS warnings or take corrective action. The crew also did not correctly use engine reversers and spoiler systems to reduce speed, resulting in a loss of runway distance. Additional findings included poor English language proficiency among the flight crew, insufficient Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) by the pilot in command, and unauthorized actions by the flight engineer in shifting engine reversers. There was a lack of mutual oversight during checklist accomplishment, and the crew disagreed about performing a go-around due to unsuitable landing conditions. The presence of the airline's General Director in the cockpit had an adverse psychological effect on crew efficiency. DETA Airline did not use correct procedures to extend the life of engines 1, 2, and 4 from a Ukrainian company, and Aria Airline's technical manager failed to supervise this matter. The main cause of the accident was identified as weak cockpit management between the crew, leading to the use of incorrect landing techniques, including the release of engine thrust reversers and engine shutdown at unsuitable times. Contributive factors included self-activity and decision-making by the copilot and flight engineer without coordination with the pilot in command, carelessness toward EGPWS warnings, and the psychological impact of the General Director's presence. Violations and deficiencies included poor supervision by Aria Airline's operation and technical managers, DETA Airline's failure to follow proper procedures for engine life extension and inform authorities, the absence of a headset for the flight engineer, incomplete crew familiarity with the Iranian AIP, and a total on-board count that did not match the written load sheet.