Accident Sequence
The aircraft departed Mitiga on a positioning flight to Moscow-Domodedovo, where it was scheduled to undergo an overhaul program. During landing on runway 32R, the aircraft crossed the threshold at a height of 12 metres with an excessive speed of 304 km/h. At a height of about five metres, the captain instructed the flight engineer to reduce speed and bring the speed levers to idle. The flight engineer confirmed this instruction. The captain then asked for the thrust reversers to be activated. In a state of confusion, the flight engineer did not confirm the instruction and asked for clarification. Possibly due to distraction, the flight engineer failed to position the power lever correctly. As a result, the aircraft floated at a height estimated between 0.5 and one metre before landing firmly 1,100 metres past the runway threshold at a speed of 258 km/h. Unable to stop within the remaining runway, the aircraft overran, lost its undercarriage, and came to rest 680 metres further, broken in three. All six occupants were rescued, among whom two were injured.
Probable Cause
The accident occurred as a result of erroneous actions by the flight engineer during operations to turn on the engine reverse when landing the plane, expressed in shifting the reverse buckets to direct thrust and putting the 1st and 4th engines to take-off mode after landing. The Commission concluded that the flight engineer’s erroneous actions were facilitated by:
- A low level of technological discipline in the crew due to the weak role of the captain as a leader, manifested in crew members not fully fulfilling the "Instructions for the interaction and technology of the crew members of the IL-62M aircraft" and Aircraft Flight Manual during descent, approach, and landing.
- Emotional relaxation of the crew at the end of a business trip and return to base.
- Lack of effective control, including via flight recorder data, over flight operations with LIBAVIA.
- The absence of control functions for other crew members regarding the flight engineer's actions during landing and the reverse status alarm in the instructions.
- The lack of simulator exercises for practicing responses to erroneous flight engineer actions during reverse activation.
- The flight engineer's workplace was not equipped with a radio headset, and no procedures existed for its use in reduced-crew flights.
- Excessive volume of the SSU speakers broadcasting external radio communications, causing additional difficulty in hearing the captain's commands.
- Fuzziness (illegibility) of the captain's commands and the lack of response when commands were not confirmed.