What happened
On February 24, 2009, an Air Nostrum BOMBARDIER CL-600 2B19 (CRJ-200ER), registration EC-IKZ, was performing a scheduled domestic flight from Madrid to Santander. While descending through approximately 19,600 feet, the aircraft experienced a simultaneous shutdown of both General Electric CF-34-3B1 engines. The flight data recorder (FDR) indicated that fuel flow to both engines dropped to 0 kg/h at 18:39:37 local time.
Following the shutdown, the air-driven generator (ADG) deployed automatically to maintain electrical power. The crew initiated engine restart procedures, selecting continuous ignition. Within approximately 37 seconds, fuel flow returned to normal levels, and the engines were successfully restarted. During the recovery process, a fellow crew member traveling as a passenger entered the cockpit and suggested declaring an emergency. The crew subsequently notified Air Traffic Control (ATC) of the double engine failure and requested landing priority. The aircraft landed safely at Santander Airport without any injuries to the 44 passengers or 4 passengers in the crew, and with no damage to the aircraft.
The investigation
The CIAIAC examined the aircraft's flight recorders, engine components, and fuel systems. Post-incident inspections of the engines, chip detectors, and fuel pumps revealed no mechanical malfunctions or significant contamination, although moderate microbiological contamination was found in the right wing tank.
Investigators analyzed the engine thrust control system and performed tests on an identical aircraft type. These tests established that the engines could be shut down at any point between the IDLE and SHUT OFF marks once the safety latches were released. The investigation also reviewed the operator's emergency checklists and the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) to evaluate crew performance and communication.
Findings
- The simultaneous engine shutdown was caused by placing the engine thrust levers below the flight idle position in an attempt to reduce thrust.
- The aircraft's thrust control design allows for engine shutdown at any position between IDLE and SHUT OFF if the safety latches are disengaged.
- The operator's manual did not explicitly warn that moving the levers below the IDLE mark could result in an engine shutdown before reaching the SHUT OFF position.
- The in-flight double engine failure procedure lacked clearly defined task sharing between the pilot flying and the pilot not flying.
- The crew's emergency declaration was prompted by a passenger/crew member in the cockpit rather than the flight crew's own internal coordination.