What happened
On March 14, 2022, at 11:11 local time, an ATR 72-212, registration EC-MNN, operated by CANARIAS AIRLINES, was on final approach to runway 03 L at Las Palmas de Gran Canaria Airport. The incident began earlier when a previous aircraft, a Boeing 737-800 (EI-HGT), reported seeing vegetation on runway 03 L. This prompted airport personnel to enter runway 03 L in a service vehicle to remove the obstacle.
To manage the runway obstruction, air traffic control diverted the incoming ATR 72-212 to runway 03 R. However, while the service vehicle was still operating on runway 03 L to clear a second piece of vegetation, the controller issued landing clearance for the ATR 702-212 to land on runway 03 R. The flight crew incorrectly read back the instruction as landing on runway 03 L. The controller failed to notice this error or correct the discrepancy.
As the aircraft continued its approach, the service vehicle driver noticed the aircraft heading toward runway 03 L and contacted the tower to ask if the aircraft was indeed landing on that runway. The controller, realizing the conflict, instructed the vehicle to vacate the runway immediately. The ATR 72-212 subsequently landed safely on runway 03 R without any injuries or damage to the aircraft.
The investigation
The CIAIAC investigation examined radar data, radio communications, and the Quick Random Access (QAR) memory of the aircraft. The investigation focused on the actions of the air traffic controller and the trainee controller on duty. The investigators reviewed the sequence of communications between the tower, the flight crew, and the airport service vehicle. The analysis also looked at the adherence to established safety protocols, including the Standardised European Rules of the Air (SERA) regarding readback verification and the airport's specific manual for runway inspections.
Findings
- The controller failed to perform an active listen during the pilot's incorrect readback, which is a requirement under SERA regulations.
- The controller did not verify the correct runway via radar monitoring or visual observation effectively enough to catch the error.
- The controller experienced confusion during communications, repeatedly misidentifying the service vehicle's callsign as "V3" instead of "V1".
- The controller failed to provide necessary information to the service vehicle regarding the incoming aircraft's path after the initial runway incursion risk was identified.
- The service vehicle was not equipped with a fleet tracking system, making it impossible to determine its exact position relative to the runway centerline at the moment of the incident.