Casualties unknown

2025-08-03: AIRBUS A321-253NY (EC-OOJ) — En las cercanías del aeropuerto Adolfo Suárez Madrid-Barajas (Madrid), ES

En las cercanías del aeropuerto Adolfo Suárez Madrid-Barajas (Madrid), ES

On August 3, 2025, an AIRBUS A321-253NY (registration EC-OOJ) was involved in an aviation accident near En las cercanías del aeropuerto Adolfo Suárez Madrid-Barajas (Madrid), ES. This summary draws on records from the Spanish Civil Aviation Accident and Incident Investigation Commission (CIAIAC).

Sourcesthe Spanish Civil Aviation Accident and Incident Investigation Commission (CIAIAC)Primary reportUpdated 1785075856Data APIEditorial standards
AIRBUS A321-253NY
Photo: Julien.scavini / CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

On 3 August 2025, an Iberia Airbus A321 experienced a bird strike shortly after takeoff from Madrid, resulting in left engine shutdown and cabin smoke. Subsequent issues with protective breathing equipment (PBE) led to crew incapacitation, prompting seven safety recommendations from the CIAIAC.

Incident Overview

On Sunday, 3 August 2025, at 14:44 UTC, an Airbus A321-253NY, registration EC-OOJ, operated by Iberia, was at approximately 6,400 ft altitude about 17 km north-northwest of Madrid-Barajas Airport (LEMD) when it struck a large bird. The aircraft had departed from Runway 36L minutes earlier as flight IB0579 bound for Paris Orly Airport (LFPO, Paris, France). On board were 2 pilots, 4 cabin crew, and 148 passengers.

The bird impacted the nose of the aircraft, shattering a large portion of the radome. Both bird remains and likely aircraft debris were ingested by the left engine. The left engine subsequently shut down, and the cabin filled with white smoke. The pilots donned oxygen masks.

PBE Malfunctions

Three of the four cabin crew members attempted to use their respective Protective Breathing Equipment (PBE) units, with unsatisfactory results:

  • The cabin crew member at position 1R (forward galley) was unable to extract the PBE from its container.
  • The cabin crew member at position 4L sustained a cut on a finger while extracting the PBE and was assisted by a colleague (4R) in donning it. This PBE apparently functioned correctly, however the crew member reported removing it after a few minutes "thinking it was not working."
  • The cabin crew member at position 4R also sustained a cut on a finger while extracting the PBE and donned it. This PBE never supplied oxygen. The crew member lost consciousness. The 1R crew member arrived at the aft galley and found the 4R crew member "unconscious on the floor with white lips, blue around the lips, red and swollen cheeks and face, and not breathing." After the 1R crew member removed the PBE and applied CPR, the 4R crew member recovered.

Investigation Findings

Inspection of the PBE used by the 4R crew member at the manufacturer's (SAFRAN Aerosystems, Grenoble, France) facilities revealed that the activation lever, designed to be actuated by the head when inserted into the mask opening, was broken. Although the hood appeared to have been placed on the head satisfactorily, the broken activation lever never released the valve supplying oxygen. Due to the mask's airtight seal, the crew member remained conscious only as long as the sealed interior volume provided oxygen; prolonged use would have led to death by asphyxiation.

Tests conducted on a fully functional PBE at the manufacturer's facility demonstrated a failure mode during donning: when the user attempts to open the neck seal using thumbs, if the left thumb is placed not at the edge but more toward the center and inside the hood, pulling to open also applies force to the activation lever in a direction it cannot rotate, causing it to break. The force required to break the lever was not high. Subsequent disassembly and comparison at the BEA materials laboratory in Paris confirmed that the broken activation lever from the incident unit and the test unit exhibited nearly identical fracture geometry.

Safety Recommendations

While the investigation remains open pending the final technical report, CIAIAC issued the following urgent safety recommendations on 24 September 2025:

  • REC 29/25: To EASA – Ensure the SAFRAN Aerosystems PBE part number 15-40F-80 is designed so that crew can don it using a procedure that excludes inadvertent manipulation of critical parts.
  • REC 30/25: To SAFRAN Aerosystems – Same as REC 29/25.
  • REC 31/25: To EASA – Ensure this PBE has a usage manual that minimizes the risk of inadvertent manipulation of critical parts.
  • REC 32/25: To SAFRAN Aerosystems – Same as REC 31/25.
  • REC 33/25: To EASA – Ensure the manual from REC 32/25 is disseminated to all operators installing PBE part number 15-40F-80, and that training is updated accordingly.
  • REC 34/25: To SAFRAN Aerosystems – Same as REC 33/25.
  • REC 35/25: To IBERIA – Ensure crew training on the SAFRAN PBE part number 15-40F-80 is as realistic as possible and alerts crews to the risks of not adhering to the established usage procedure.