4 fatalities

Crash of Slick Airways Lockheed 1049H at San Francisco International Airport (N9740Z)

San Francisco, United States of AmericaLanding (descent or approach)

On February 3, 1963, a Lockheed L-1049 Super Constellation (registration N9740Z) operated by Slick Airways was involved in an aviation accident near San Francisco, United States of America during landing or approach. 4 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The Board determines the probable cause of this accident was the continuation of an instrument approach after adequate visual reference was lost below authorized minimums. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A); 1 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 2026-06-12Data APIEditorial standards

On February 3, 1963, a Slick Airways Lockheed 1049H crashed during an ILS approach to San Francisco International Airport, killing four and seriously injuring four. The aircraft struck approach lights and crashed on runway 28L.

Accident Details

A Slick Airways Lockheed 1049H, registered N9740Z, crashed and burned during an ILS approach to runway 28R at San Francisco International Airport at approximately 1207 Pacific standard time on February 3, 1963. The aircraft was destroyed by subsequent fire.

Sequence of Events

Due to an inoperative glide slope receiver, the crew was listening to radar advisories on the localizer receiver for altitude information. The aircraft struck approach lights 1,170 feet from the runway threshold, climbed to about 200 feet, and then crashed approximately 1,900 feet beyond the threshold and on the left edge of runway 28L.

Injuries and Damage

Of the three crew members and five passengers aboard, the captain, first officer, and two passengers received fatal injuries. The remaining persons aboard received serious injuries. The aircraft was destroyed by fire.

Probable Cause

The official probable cause, as determined by the Civil Aeronautics Board, was the continuation of an instrument approach after adequate visual reference was lost below authorized minimums. Inadequate monitoring of the instrument approach by the PAR controller was a contributing factor.