Introduction
On 2 July 1995, a Yakovlev JAK-52 with registration LY-AIT crashed at Alytus Aeroclub in Lithuania. The aircraft was destroyed and both pilots died. No third party damage was reported.
Flight Details
The flight was conducted under visual flight rules in daytime with good meteorological conditions: wind 10° at 1-2 m/s, visibility more than 10 km, cloud base around 1600 m, cloud cover 2 oktas, QNH 1014 hPa. The purpose was to perform aerobatic maneuvers over the aerodrome. The aircraft took off at 10:10 local time. Eight minutes later, at 10:18, the crash occurred within the aerodrome boundaries.
Sequence of Events
A video recording captured three aerobatic figures: a vertical turn (ranversman) with a 1/4 barrel roll downward, an upward 45° torque roll, and a flat spin. These are classified as complex high-level aerobatics. Based on the complexity, the investigation concluded the aircraft was piloted by Pilot A from the second seat (instructor position).
Before the fatal maneuver (flat spin), the aircraft climbed with a partial turn, then established a climb angle of about 30-40° above the horizon, reduced engine power to decrease speed for spin entry. The entry speed and altitude could not be determined because the barograph was not installed or activated. Witnesses estimated the entry altitude at about 1000 m. The aircraft entered a flat right spin. During the spin, the ailerons were deflected opposite to the rotation, the rudder was neutral, and the elevator was in a nose-down position. The aircraft completed 14 turns. Shortly before ground impact, the ailerons were returned to neutral, which allowed recovery from the flat spin, but with only 50-60 m of altitude left, the aircraft transitioned into a dive and struck the ground at approximately an 80° angle.
Investigation Findings
No technical malfunctions were found that could have caused the accident. The investigation determined that the aircraft was not certified for aerobatic maneuvers due to load factor limits of +5/-3 g. Pilot A was flying from the second seat without the required instructor qualification, sufficient practice, or authorization for such flights. In the emergency situation, he was unable to regain control. The flight director lacked aerobatic experience and could not provide qualified advice via radio; he also did not monitor the aircraft in the zone.
Additional issues included: lack of appointed personnel responsible for training and flight operations at the aeroclub; absence of objective control devices (barographs) on flights; radio communications were not always recorded; and organizational shortcomings in flight management.
Conclusions
The investigation identified the following primary causes of the accident: 1. Control of the aircraft from the second (instructor) seat by Pilot A, who lacked necessary skills, qualifications, and authorization for such flights, resulting in inability to control the aircraft in a difficult situation. 2. Low organizational level of flight operations at Alytus Aeroclub.